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Missouri Revised Statutes
Chapter 287 http://www.moga.state.mo.us/statutes/ Part 1
Citation of law. 287.010. This chapter shall be known as "The Workers' Compensation Law". (RSMo 1939 § 3689, A.L. 1980 H.B. 1396) Prior revision: 1929 § 3299 (1960) Defenses that injuries to employee were subject to workmen's compensation law and that plaintiff was estopped to sue by accepting benefits cannot be raised by motion to dismiss but should be asserted by answer. Roberts v. Epicure Foods Co. (Mo.), 330 S.W.2d 837. (1960) Fact that employee who is required to work in place where she necessarily inhaled noxious fumes with the result that she contracted pulmonary emphysema did not render the workmen's compensation law of Missouri inapplicable to her injury. Common law action for negligence of employer dismissed. Oggesen v. General Cable Corp., 273 F.2d 331. (1962) Where maintenance man in attempting to unlock a perforating machine placed a pipe over wrench handle and bounced up and down on end of pipe thereby sustaining back injury, the injury was an accident and compensable. Brotherton v. International Shoe Company (A.), 360 S.W.2d 108. (1962) Evidence supported finding claimant as result of fall suffered fifteen percent permanent partial disability of left arm where elbow was enlarged and would tire during the day although there was no loss of motion and claimant suffered no loss of earnings. Franklin v. St. Louis Independent Packing Company (A.), 360 S.W.2d 350. (1963) Evidence was sufficient to justify finding of industrial commission that claimant sustained an accident when he slipped on floor and twisted his back while holding a sixty-pound sack of sugar and fell resulting in injuries to his lower back notwithstanding his medical testimony was only to the effect that it was possible that the accident resulted in the back injury. Smith v. Terminal Transfer Company (A.), 372 S.W.2d 659. (1967) Where employee was injured in automobile accident while on the way to work in transportation furnished by the employer, the transportation was an implied term of and within the scope of the employment contract, and the accident arose out of and in the course of employee's employment. Griffin v. Ross (A.), 411 S.W.2d 649. (1967) An accidental injury "arises out of" employment only when there is a causal connection between the employee's injury and his employment, and a claimant meets this requirement only when the injury is the rational consequence of an act incidental to his employment. Blatt v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (A.), 413 S.W.2d 533. (1967) A showing that claimant's job involved pulling two hundred and fifty pound car loaded with staves onto a skid and was done intentionally in accordance with preconceived design and that nothing unusual occurred other than claimant feeling a pain was not sufficient evidence to sustain the burden of proof that claimant had experienced an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Bauer v. Independent Stave Co. (A.), 417 S.W.2d 693. (1968) Driver hired by delivery service to work exclusively on hauling for cooperage company, under the direction and control of cooperage company, was employee of cooperage company for workmen's compensation purposes. Feldmann v. Dot Delivery Service (A.), 425 S.W.2d 491. (1980) Exclusive remedy of parents of deceased worker for compensation for alleged wrongful death of worker in employment accident under Workers' Compensation Law; overruling Miller v. Hotel Savoy Co. (A.), 68 S.W.2d 929. Combs v. City of Maryville (A.), 609 S.W.2d 475. (1991) Where worker alleges wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress, Missouri's workers' compensation law provides exclusive remedy for emotional distress inflicted during course of employment. Waldermeyer v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 767 F.Supp. 989 (E.D. Mo.). (1993) Where employee alleged former employer invaded her privacy because there was peep hole between her bathroom and supervisors' bathroom, court ruled that in all instances where an injured person seeks to hold employer liable under any common law tort theory, including intentional torts, for injuries resulting from work experiences, Labor and Industrial Relations Commission has exclusive initial jurisdiction to determine whether injuries are result of an accident covered by workers' compensation. Massey v. Victor I. Phillips Co., 827 F.Supp. 597 (W.D. Mo.). (1993) Where police officer alleged intentional torts by city and by co-employees individually, claim against city was barred by workers' compensation act; however, claims against individual co-employees, including police chief, were not barred by workers' compensation act. Russell v. City of Overland Police Dept., 838 F.Supp 1350 (E.D. Mo.). (1993) Where claimant who was employed by company based in Jefferson City was traveling home from job site at Lake of the Ozarks with saw belonging to company in car, travel did not serve mutual benefit and dual purpose doctrine did not apply. Accident did not occur on employer's premises or at work site; therefore, claim did not fall within workers' compensation act. Stockman v. J.C. Industries, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. App. W.D.).
287.020. 1. The word "employee" as used in this chapter shall be construed to mean every person in the service of any employer, as defined in this chapter, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, or under any appointment or election, including executive officers of corporations. Any reference to any employee who has been injured shall, when the employee is dead, also include his dependents, and other persons to whom compensation may be payable. The word "employee" shall also include all minors who work for an employer, whether or not such minors are employed in violation of law, and all such minors are hereby made of full age for all purposes under, in connection with, or arising out of this chapter. The word "employee" shall not include an individual who is the owner and operator of a motor vehicle which is leased or contracted with a driver to a for-hire common or contract motor vehicle carrier operating within a commercial zone as defined in section 390.020 or 390.041, RSMo, or operating under a certificate issued by the motor carrier and railroad safety division of the department of economic development or by the interstate commerce commission. 2. The word "accident" as used in this chapter shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen identifiable event or series of events happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury. An injury is compensable if it is clearly work related. An injury is clearly work related if work was a substantial factor in the cause of the resulting medical condition or disability. An injury is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor. 3. (1) In this chapter the term "injury" is hereby defined to be an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment. The injury must be incidental to and not independent of the relation of employer and employee. Ordinary, gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging shall not be compensable, except where the deterioration or degeneration follows as an incident of employment. (2) An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if: (a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the employment is a substantial factor in causing the injury; and (b) It can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work; and (c) It can be fairly traced to the employment as a proximate cause; and (d) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life; (3) The terms "injury" and "personal injuries" shall mean violence to the physical structure of the body and to the personal property which is used to make up the physical structure of the body, such as artificial dentures, artificial limbs, glass eyes, eyeglasses, and other prostheses which are placed in or on the body to replace the physical structure and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom. These terms shall in no case except as specifically provided in this chapter be construed to include occupational disease in any form, nor shall they be construed to include any contagious or infectious disease contracted during the course of the employment, nor shall they include death due to natural causes occurring while the worker is at work. 4. "Death" when mentioned as a basis for the right to compensation means only death resulting from such violence and its resultant effects occurring within three hundred weeks after the accident; except that in cases of occupational disease, the limitation of three hundred weeks shall not be applicable. 5. Without otherwise affecting either the meaning or interpretation of the abridged clause, "personal injuries arising out of and in the course of such employment", it is hereby declared not to cover workers except while engaged in or about the premises where their duties are being performed, or where their services require their presence as a part of such service. 6. A person who is employed by the same employer for more than five and one-half consecutive work days shall for the purpose of this chapter be considered an "employee". 7. The term "total disability" as used in this chapter shall mean inability to return to any employment and not merely mean inability to return to the employment in which the employee was engaged at the time of the accident. 8. As used in this chapter and all acts amendatory thereof, the term "commission" shall hereafter be construed as meaning and referring exclusively to the labor and industrial relations commission of Missouri, and the term "director" shall hereafter be construed as meaning the director of the department of insurance of the state of Missouri or such agency of government as shall exercise the powers and duties now conferred and imposed upon the department of insurance of the state of Missouri. 9. The term "division" as used in this chapter means the division of workers' compensation of the department of labor and industrial relations of the state of Missouri. 10. For the purposes of this chapter, the term "minor" means a person who has not attained the age of eighteen years; except that, for the purpose of computing the compensation provided for in this chapter, the provisions of section 287.250 shall control. (RSMo 1939 § 3695, A.L. 1947 V. II p. 438; RSMo 1939 § 3744; A.L. 1945 p. 1996, A.L. 1959 S.B. 167, A.L. 1963 p. 408, A.L. 1967 p. 384, A.L. 1974 S.B. 417, A.L. 1977 S.B. 49, A.L. 1978 H.B. 1260, A.L. 1980 H.B. 1396, A.L. 1981 H.B. 324, A.L. 1993 S.B. 251) Prior revision: 1929 §§ 3305, 3354 CROSS REFERENCE: Division of motor carrier and railroad safety abolished, duties and functions transferred to highways and transportation commission and department of transportation, RSMo 226.008 Accident (1960) Where the ordinary performance of claimant's duties in laundry necessitated immersion of her hand in "sour solution" from time to time which allegedly caused her hand to swell and redden, resulting in loss of strength in the hand and arm, the occurrence or event was not an accident within the meaning of this section. Smith v. Cascade Laundry Co. (A.), 335 S.W.2d 501. (1962) Employee who had climbed ladder to work on guttering and before doing any work on the gutter, suffered fatal heart attack, did not sustain an "accident" resulting in death so as to come under the workmen's compensation act. Love v. Land (A.), 356 S.W.2d 105. (1963) Where it was routine for employee on occasion to place her foot on machine for additional pulling power as she struggled to remove aluminum strips from notching machine, hernia she suffered on one such occasion did not result from an abnormal or unexpected strain sufficient to constitute a compensable accident. Hall v. Midcontinent Manufacturing Co. (A.), 366 S.W.2d 57. (1963) Evidence sufficient to support commission's finding that employee who had some previous disability in his spine sustained accident in the course of his employment which resulted in injury to back and spine and effecting permanent partial disability of the body as a whole referable solely to the accident. Davis v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. (A.), 366 S.W.2d 84. (1963) Claimant's sudden unexpected breaking through concrete floor with jackhammer and violent jerking of claimant to his knee constituted an accident within meaning of this section and spasms of muscles on left side of back found by doctor two days later were objective symptoms of injury produced "at the time" in absence of showing of independent intervening cause. Smith v. American Car & Foundry Div., A.C.F. Ind., Inc. (A.), 368 S.W.2d 515. (1963) Where claimant, in ducking away from falling pieces of glass from employer's window which cracked from gust of wind, fell on floor and cut his hand, injury resulted from accident arising out of course of employment and not from act of God. Pierce v. Luce Manufacturing Company (A.), 375 S.W.2d 351. (1963) Janitor who collapsed and died from coronary heart attack after shoveling six-inch deep snow from extensive sidewalk area had not suffered any "unusual or abnormal strain" during the course of his job activity so that it could be said he sustained an accident within the meaning of this section, and award of benefits was reversed. Flippin v. First National Bank of Joplin (A.), 372 S.W.2d 273. (1964) Claimant who while ascending stairs turned to see who was hollering behind him and allegedly suffered a herniated disc, was not entitled to compensation since turning was voluntary and injury did not result from accident. Errante v. Fisher Body Division, General Motors Corp. (A.), 374 S.W.2d 521. (1965) Held that an "accident" under this section must have an element of the unexpected and abnormal and that an injury received while performing a normal or routine activity does not qualify. Closser v. Fleming Company (A.), 387 S.W.2d 194. (1965) Strain resulting when respondent was required to assume an extended position with his body which placed him completely out of a normal, usual or routine lifting position was an accident within meaning of this section. Merriman v. Ben Gutman Truck Service, Inc. (Mo.), 392 S.W.2d 292. (1966) Employee loading truck in usual and customary manner, who suffered back injury when the load shifted under the box causing additional effort to place box in proper position, did not sustain an accident within the meaning of that word as defined in this section. Baker v. Krey Packing Co. (A.), 398 S.W.2d 185. (1966) An abnormal strain causing injury to a workman may generally be classified as an accident within the meaning of this section, even though it was not preceded or accompanied by a slip or a fall. Miller v. Lever Brothers Company (A.), 400 S.W.2d 625. (1966) Reaction of employee to inoculation administered by doctor who was agent of employer and which resulted in injury was "accident" within meaning of this section. Lampkin v. Harzfeld's (Mo.), 407 S.W.2d 894. (1967) The definition of the word "accident" is broad enough to include an unusual or abnormal strain, but a back injury suffered in course of usual work where no abnormal or unusual strain contributed to injury was not an accident. Mason v. F.W. Strecker Transfer Company (A.), 409 S.W.2d 267. (1967) Where events followed in rapid succession, and formed one continuous chain uninterrupted by an intervening cause, and terminated in the employee's injury, they cannot logically be separated. Raef v. Stock-Hartis, Inc. (A.), 416 S.W.2d 201. (1967) Back injury sustained while in awkward bent position carrying and placing boxes weighing thirty-five to forty pounds was not due to abnormal strain and was not within statutory definition of accident. Withers v. Midwest Footwear, Inc. (A.), 421 S.W.2d 800. (1971) Inhalation of paint dust and paint fumes for a period of over three years by person employed as sander and spray painter of dispensing machines, and resulting effect on his body and lungs, including aggravation of preexisting condition of tuberculosis held not an "accident" under this section. Bess v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of St. Louis (A.), 469 S.W.2d 40. (1972) Evidence supported award to claimant who in November, 1966, suffered back pain when he slipped while pushing gate skid, was treated by company doctor until hospitalized in December and put in traction for a week, and in January, 1967, passed physical exam for new employer but continued to have pain and treatment and in December, 1967, was diagnosed as having protruding and enlarged disc which cut nerve root and was subsequently operated upon, although claimant's testimony was conflicting as to peripheral issues but not on the central issue of causation. Graphenreed v. Ford Motor Co. (A.), 482 S.W.2d 68. (1972) Evidence sufficient to support finding of commission that accident wherein grinding wheel claimant was operating exploded, struck his groin, slashed his penis and tore open scrotal sac directly caused sexual impotence and anxiety neurosis which resulted in his permanent partial industrial disability. Greer v. Black, Sivalls and Bryson, Inc. (A.), 483 S.W.2d 763. (1973) Workman lifting sixty-pound milk containers felt sharp pain and later required surgery for ruptured vertebra disc, held not an "accident" since such lifting was part of his normal routine. Herring v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (A.), 499 S.W.2d 538. (1973) Held that unusual abnormal and continuous physical and mental strain sustained by over-the-road truck driver constituted an "accident" within the meaning of the workmen's compensation statute. Snugges v. Steel Haulers, Inc. (Mo.) 501 S.W.2d 481. (1974) Held that where workman was found dying after he had unloaded cargo in his normal job there was no presumption of accident. A heart attack is not "accidental" unless it results from unusual exertion and strain. It is incumbent on plaintiffs to produce affirmative evidence of accident. Russell v. Southwest Grease and Oil Co. (A.), 509 S.W.2d 776. (1974) Held that accident, stooping to pick up coupon behind narrow checkout counter which caused severe pain in lower back is not a compensable accident. Roux v. Dugal's Big Star Food Store (A.), 510 S.W.2d 810. (1976) Held, that where piece of meat lodged in decedent's windpipe causing death from lack of oxygen and deceased was a journalist covering the banquet a compensable accident occurred. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Majersky (A.), 531 S.W.2d 765. (1978) Notice or knowledge by employer of dangerous condition is not a consideration in determining foreseeability of event, thus fact that employer may have been negligent is not relevant in determining whether "accident occurs". Leicht v. Venture Stores, Inc. (A.), 562 S.W.2d 401. Course of Employment (1961) Injuries caused by falling door sustained by employee during her uncompensated lunch period when, after eating, she attempted to enter storeroom of employer for purpose of exchanging knife she had purchased and was required to furnish in her work for one more suitable, arose out of and in the course of her employment precluding recovery therefor at common law. Daniels v. Krey Packing Co. (Mo.), 346 S.W.2d 78. (1962) Injuries sustained from fall, caused by insulin reaction, to concrete floor from assembly line platform 12 1/2 inches above floor held not to have arisen out of course of employment. Howard v. Ford Motor Co. (A.), 363 S.W.2d 61. (1963) Injuries sustained by employee held not to arise out of and in the course of her employment when she slipped and fell on ice and snow in public alley behind place of employment while on her way to work, although employees were required to enter and exit by rear door opening onto public alley. Hawley v. Eddy Brothers, Inc. (A.), 371 S.W.2d 338. (1964) Injuries sustained by claimant, employed as service station attendant and whose competition in drag racing was sponsored by station owner for advertising purposes, in accident while driving service station truck with owner's permission on way to pick up engine for racing car held to arise out of and in the course of his employment. Liverman v. Wagner (A.), 384 S.W.2d 107. (1965) Words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character, while words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. Kammeyer v. Board of Education (A.), 393 S.W.2d 122. (1968) Injury to employee who fell over wire hoop on premises of employer while returning from an off-the-premises break during the paid hours of his employment, where ownership or origin of the hoop was not known and walkway where fall occurred was not normal place of ingress or egress, was not an accident arising out of the course of his employment. Kunce v. Junge Baking Co. (A.), 432 S.W.2d 602. Employee (1961) Where claimant, electrician, and his crew were employed at hourly rate to perform work on a job until such time as subcontractor could "move on" the job with his own crew, under the facts of the case, the finding by the commission that claimant was an employee and not an independent contractor was justified. Specie v. Howerton Electric Co. (A.), 344 S.W.2d 314. (1962) The principal owner and director of a corporation who owned substantially all of the stock and directed its every operation was not an employee within the meaning of the workmen's compensation law and therefore was ineligible for benefits. Gazzoli v. Star Novelty Co. (A.), 354 S.W.2d 296. (1962) Evidence sustained finding that building company engaged in production of prefabricated houses had loaned its employee to real estate developer entitling employee to receive compensation from such developer for injuries sustained while working on prefabricated house sold to developer. Smith v. Home Building Contractors, Inc. (A.), 363 S.W.2d 11; Pulliam v. Home Building Contractors, Inc. (A.), 363 S.W.2d 48. (1963) Where claimant was president, manager and half owner of corporation, and was under the control of no one and was the sole judge of what he did and when and how he did it, he was not an employee in the service of the corporation. Voss v. Merchants Dairy Company (A.), 373 S.W.2d 662. (1965) Employee of a janitorial service firm suffered injury while applying caustic solution to a floor in a shoe factory under direction of agent of shoe factory. Held facts did not support a finding of "borrowed employee". Musielak v. International Shoe Co. (A.), 387 S.W.2d 217. (1965) Relationship of master and servant must exist for the claim to be compensable, and the test of the relationship is the right to control the means and manner of service, as distinguished from controlling the ultimate results of the service. Gass v. White Superior Bus Co. (A.), 395 S.W.2d 501. (1967) Claimant who owned 49 or 100 outstanding shares of alleged corporate employer, was secretary-treasurer of company and shop foreman in its plant was an employee of the corporation. Saxton v. St. Louis Stair Company (A.), 410 S.W.2d 369. (1969) Workmen's compensation claimant who owned and operated dump truck, hauled gravel, and charged for price of gravel plus hauling charge, and was billed by the gravel company for price of gravel on a regular basis, and who was injured on gravel company's property was a statutory employee, not a regular employee. Offutt v. Travelers Insurance Co. (A.), 437 S.W.2d 127. (1969) Volunteer working at hospital without pay was an employee within meaning of employee "under any appointment or election" in this section. Orphant v. St. Louis State Hospital, Division of Mental Diseases (Mo.), 441 S.W.2d 355. (1977) Sole proprietor of unincorporated business is not an "employee" and is not eligible for benefits for injury received while performing duties normally performed by an employee. Bethel v. Sunlight Janitor Service (Mo.), 551 S.W.2d 616. Occupational Disease (1956) Disability from occupational disease regarded as an industrial accident, and the occurrence of the disability as the event or accident which gave rise to liability. Staples v. A.P. Green Fire Brick Co. (A.), 296 S.W.2d 498. (1956) Where employee's death from silico-tuberculosis, an occupational disease, did not occur within 300 weeks after the occurrence of disability, claimants were not entitled to recover for death. Staples v. A.P. Green Fire Brick Co. (A.), 296 S.W.2d 498. (1958) Noise induced hearing loss held not an occupational disease within the workmen's compensation law. Marie v. Standard Steel Works (A.), 311 S.W.2d 368. Reversed: (Mo.) 319 S.W.2d 871 (1959) held that finding of commission that noise induced deafness was occupational disease was within its powers. (1958) Holding that disease (cancer of urinary tract) allegedly resulting from exposure to harmful chemicals, which was not theretofore known to be incidental and peculiar to an occupation, was an occupational disease within this statute, sustained. King v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 256 F.2d 812. Total Disability (1958) In determining whether claimant is totally disabled, the question is whether any employer, in the usual course of business, seeking persons to perform duties of employment in the usual and customary way would reasonably be expected to employ him in his existing physical condition. Groce v. Pyle (A.), 315 S.W.2d 482. (1981) An uncompensated worker is an employee by appointment within the meaning of the workers' compensation law if he is in the service of an employer and that employer exercises control or has the right of control, over the worker. Stegeman v. St. Francis Xavier Parish (Mo.), 611 S.W.2d 204. (1983) Liberally construing the term "accident" as used in the Workers' Compensation Act, so long as an injury is clearly job related, it is compensable. Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Service, Inc. (Mo. banc), 646 S.W.2d 781. (1993) Where volunteer regularly worked on Wednesdays, volunteer was not an employee for purposes of workers' compensation coverage when injured on a day not scheduled to work and agency had no control over volunteer on day of accident. Talir v. Midwest Area Agency on Aging, 848 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. App. E.D.)
287.021. 1. As used in this chapter, the term "employee" includes a sheriff or deputy sheriff and the term "employer" includes a county in regard to a sheriff or deputy sheriff. 2. Each county shall provide workers' compensation insurance in an insurance group licensed to write workers' compensation insurance in this state, or a city also recognized as a county may have at all times sufficient self-insurance coverage, so that all sheriffs and deputy sheriffs in the county or self-insured city recognized as a county will be covered. 3. The "average earnings" of a sheriff or deputy sheriff is his annual salary, or fourteen dollars per day, whichever is greater. 4. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to create any tort liability upon a county or to impose any duty upon a county other than complying with this chapter in relation to sheriffs and deputy sheriffs. (L. 1973 H.B. 534 § 1, A.L. 1980 H.B. 1396, H.B. 1596)
287.030. 1. The word "employer" as used in this chapter shall be construed to mean: (1) Every person, partnership, association, corporation, limited liability partnership or company, trustee, receiver, the legal representatives of a deceased employer, and every other person, including any person or corporation operating a railroad and any public service corporation, using the service of another for pay; (2) The state, county, municipal corporation, township, school or road, drainage, swamp and levee districts, or school boards, board of education, regents, curators, managers or control commission, board or any other political subdivision, corporation, or quasi-corporation, or cities under special charter, or under the commission form of government; (3) Any of the above-defined employers must have five or more employees to be deemed an employer for the purposes of this chapter unless election is made to become subject to the provisions of this chapter as provided in subsection 2 of section 287.090, except that construction industry employers who erect, demolish, alter or repair improvements shall be deemed an employer for the purposes of this chapter if they have one or more employees. An employee who is a member of the employer's family within the third degree of affinity or consanguinity shall be counted in determining the total number of employees of such employer. 2. Any reference to the employer shall also include his or her insurer or group self-insurer. (RSMo 1939 § 3694, A.L. 1974 S.B. 417, A.L. 1978 H.B. 1260, A.L. 1979 H.B. 496, A.L. 1990 S.B. 751, A.L. 1998 H.B. 1237, et al.) Prior revision: 1929 § 3304 (1958) Where employee of company owning trucks was placed under direction of company which leased a tractor and trailer and latter company had right to control him in performance of his duties, he became employee of leasing company and his general employer was not liable for his accidental death while so employed. Patton v. Patton (Mo.), 308 S.W.2d 739.
287.035. 1. The benefits provided by this chapter resulting from work-related injuries shall apply to partners or sole proprietors, only when such partners or sole proprietors have individually elected to procure insurance policy protection for themselves against injuries sustained while in the pursuit of their vocation, profession or business. 2. An election by partners or sole proprietors to secure the protection of the benefits authorized by this chapter for themselves shall include their employees, if any, who are not eligible for compensation benefits except as provided by this section.
3. As respects the extension of benefits to employees pursuant to this section, there shall be general application of the compensation law; provided, however, section 287.030 shall be construed to encompass the limited application of this section to employers having less than five employees. 4. Insurers who underwrite the protection authorized by this section shall be directly and primarily liable for the benefits provided by this chapter. 5. It is the expressed intent of this section to allow the optional purchase of the protection for workers' injuries sustained by partners or sole proprietors, including their employees, while in the pursuit of their vocation, profession or business. As provided in this chapter, administrative and appellant jurisdiction shall be extended in regard to disagreements between injured individuals and their insurers, but any provision of this chapter requiring an employer-employee status, where none exists, is hereby waived to accomplish the limited application of this section. 6. (1) This chapter shall apply to any employee who is related to a partner or sole proprietor within the third degree of affinity or consanguinity unless such employee is withdrawn by the partner or sole proprietor from the coverage of the provisions of this chapter; (2) Any partner or sole proprietor who wishes to withdraw from coverage any employee set forth in subdivision (1) of this subsection from the provisions of this chapter may do so by indicating such withdrawal from coverage under the provisions of a valid workers' compensation insurance policy by listing such employees to be withdrawn. The notice of withdrawal shall be in a manner and on a form as determined by the director of the department of insurance. Such form shall require a list of those family member employees to be withdrawn, as described in subdivision (1) of this subsection. The withdrawal shall take effect and continue from the effective date of the insurance policy and any endorsements thereto up until the expiration date of the insurance policy or by written notice to the group self-insurer of which the employer is a member. (L. 1983 H.B. 556, A.L. 1998 H.B. 1237, et al.)
287.037. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, beginning January 1, 1997, those insurance companies providing coverage pursuant to chapter 287, to a limited liability company, as defined in section 347.015, RSMo, shall provide coverage for the employees of the limited liability company who are not members of the limited liability company. Members of the limited liability company, as defined in section 347.015, RSMo, shall also be provided coverage pursuant to chapter 287, but such members may individually elect to reject such coverage by providing a written notice of such rejection on a form developed by the department of insurance to the limited liability company and its insurer. Failure to provide notice to the limited liability company shall not be grounds for any member to claim that the rejection of such coverage is not legally effective. A member who elects to reject such coverage shall not thereafter be entitled to workers' compensation benefits under the policy, even if serving or working in the capacity of an employee of the limited liability company, at least until such time as said member provides the limited liability company and its insurer with a written notice which rescinds the prior rejection of such coverage. The written notice which rescinds the prior rejection of such coverage shall be on a form developed by the department of insurance. Any rescission shall be prospective in nature and shall entitle the member only to such benefits which accrue on or after the date the notice of rescission form is received by the insurance company. (L. 1996 H.B. 1368 § 1)
287.040. 1. Any person who has work done under contract on or about his premises which is an operation of the usual business which he there carries on shall be deemed an employer and shall be liable under this chapter to such contractor, his subcontractors, and their employees, when injured or killed on or about the premises of the employer while doing work which is in the usual course of his business. 2. The provisions of this section shall apply to the relationship of landlord and tenant, and lessor or lessee, when created for the fraudulent purpose of avoiding liability, but not otherwise. In such cases the landlord or lessor shall be deemed the employer of the employees of the tenant or lessee. 3. The provisions of this section shall not apply to the owner of premises upon which improvements are being erected, demolished, altered or repaired by an independent contractor but such independent contractor shall be deemed to be the employer of the employees of his subcontractors and their subcontractors when employed on or about the premises where the principal contractor is doing work. 4. In all cases mentioned in the preceding subsections, the immediate contractor or subcontractor shall be liable as an employer of the employees of his subcontractors. All persons so liable may be made parties to the proceedings on the application of any party. The liability of the immediate employer shall be primary, and that of the others secondary in their order, and any compensation paid by those secondarily liable may be recovered from those primarily liable, with attorney's fees and expenses of the suit. Such recovery may be had on motion in the original proceedings. No such employer shall be liable as in this section provided, if the employee was insured by his immediate or any intermediate employer. (RSMo 1939 § 3698) Prior revision: 1929 § 3308 (1958) Filling station employee injured while working on his own private car during working hours held not to have suffered injury arising out of and in course of employment. Carriker v. Lindsey (A.), 313 S.W.2d 43. (1960) Government contractor employed guards to protect work on classified material under government contract and also arranged with a corporation providing guard service to provide some of the guards. Since the government contractor had control of the guards furnished by the separate corporation they were statutory employees and therefore subject to the workmen's compensation law. Anderson v. Benson Mfg. Co. (Mo.), 338 S.W.2d 812. (1960) Where comprehensive liability policy issued to employer stated that it did not provide coverage "to any employee with respect to injury to another employee of the same employer injured in the course of such employment in an accident arising out of the maintenance or use of the automobile in the business of such employer" it excluded coverage to statutory employee who was employed by an independent contractor to perform services on the premises of the employer. Ward v. Curry (Mo.), 341 S.W.2d 830. (1960) Iron worker employee of contractor, who had contract with steel company under which contractor's operations were conducted almost as a department of the steel company, who was injured while performing duties at direction of the steel company held subject to the workmen's compensation law of Missouri and therefore not entitled to maintain an action for his injuries against the steel company. Kirch v. Armco Steel Corp., 274 F.2d 120. (1961) A siding applicator, injured in fall from scaffold, was statutory employee of contractor where he and co-worker performed bulk of the job the contractor had agreed to perform and it was immaterial whether he was an employee or independent contractor. Schwandt v. Witte (Mo.), 346 S.W.2d 50. (1962) In personal injury action against steel company evidence presented question for jury as to whether plaintiff, driver of truck for contractor who provided delivery service for the steel company, was statutory employee of steel company. Walton v. United States Steel Corp. (Mo.), 362 S.W.2d 617. (1962) An implied contract according to the customs of the trade is sufficient to make the contractor an employer for workmen's compensation purposes. Cross v. Crabtree (A.), 364 S.W.2d 61. (1964) In view of sections 287.040 and 287.120 subcontractor's injured employee could not maintain common law action for damages against general contractor. Thompson v. Kroeger (Mo.), 380 S.W.2d 339. (1965) Employee of a janitorial service firm suffered injury while applying caustic solution to a floor under direction of agent of defendant shoe manufacturer. Held facts did not justify a finding that plaintiff was an employee of defendant shoe firm for purposes of workmen's compensation. Musielak v. International Shoe Company (A.), 387 S.W.2d 217. (1965) In those instances where an owner is having improvements erected, demolished, altered or repaired by an independent contractor, an intermediate subcontractor, between the general contractor and the subcontractor at the bottom of the chain, occupies a status of statutory employer of the employees of their subcontractor, is secondarily liable for injuries to these employees, and is rendered immune from suits based on negligence by this section. Anderson v. Steurer (Mo.), 391 S.W.2d 839. (1965) "Premises", as used in this section contemplates any place, under exclusive control of employer, where employer's usual business is being carried on or conducted. Johnson v. Simpson Oil Co. (A.), 394 S.W.2d 91. (1966) Person who was injured while installing electrical outlets under contract in a store was not an employee of the store within the meaning of this section where the installation of electrical outlets was not a usual activity in the course of the store's business. Shireman v. Rainen Home Furnishers, Inc. (A.), 402 S.W.2d 64. (1967) Where employee of independent contractor was injured while operating bulldozer for employer on premises leased by partnership from county as rubbish disposal area at time when partnership had no permission from city to do any work in area and had no right to exclusive control of area, partners were not employee's statutory employer and bulldozing of road was not part of usual business of partners. Nagle v. Drew (A.), 409 S.W.2d 264. (1967) An organization engaged in the business of furnishing workmen to its customers, usually on a temporary basis, charging the customer and paying the furnished workmen was not an independent contractor within the meaning of this section. Wright v. Habco, Inc. (Mo.), 419 S.W.2d 34. (1968) Insurer who refused to defend in state court negligence action after timely notice is collaterally estopped in case to enforce the judgment from claiming employee was covered by workmen's compensation. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Hase (A.), 390 F.2d 151. (1969) Workmen's compensation claimant who owned and operated dump truck, hauled gravel, and charged for price of gravel plus hauling charge, and was billed by the gravel company for price of gravel on a regular basis, and who was injured on gravel company's property was a statutory employee, not a regular employee. Offutt v. Travelers Insurance Co. (A.), 437 S.W.2d 127. (1970) Where the evidence establishes that the prime contractor is the statutory employer of an employee of subcontractor, workmen's compensation relief is the exclusive remedy and no action based on negligence can be maintained against the prime contractor. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dondlinger and Sons Const. Co. (CA Mo.), 420 F.2d 1368. (1971) Highway contractor who contracted with oil jobber for supply of fuel to contractors' machinery at construction site was not statutory employer of driver of oil jobber's truck who was injured in accident while delivering fuel at construction site. Wallace v. Porter DeWitt Construction Company (A.) 480 S.W.2d 129. (1972) In action by truck driver for damages for personal injuries sustained in helping defendant's employee unload carpeting consigned to defendant carpet installer, issue as to whether or not unloading of carpeting was part of usual business which defendant carried on so as to make plaintiff a statutory employee or borrowed servant of defendant with exclusive remedy under workmen's compensation law was for the jury. Sippel v. Custom Craft Tile, Inc. (A.), 480 S.W.2d 87. (1972) As used in subdivision 1 of this section, the term "premises" is not restricted to the permanent site of the statutory employer's business nor limited to property owned or leased by him, but contemplates any place under the exclusive control of the statutory employer where his usual business is being carried on or conducted. Boatman v. Superior Outdoor Advertising Co. (A.), 482 S.W.2d 743. (1973) Truck driver held not statutory employee when injured while assisting unloading of truck required only by Union Rule and not by contract between employer and customer. Ferguson v. Air-Hydraulics Co. (A.), 492 S.W.2d 130. (1974) Held evidence that carpenter remodeling a garage for brick manufacturer to be leased to a trucking company hauling bricks was not a statutory employee of either company. Saale v. Alton Brick Company (A.), 508 S.W.2d 243. (1974) Employee injured on parkway of public street while returning to work from place where she took her meal was not compensable. Spacy v. Stout's Feed and Supply (A.), 512 S.W.2d 849. (1976) Held, an employee may be determined to be a "statutory employee" as a matter of law and this status does not have to be a jury question. Brown v. Gamble Construction Co., Inc. (A.), 537 S.W.2d 685. (1976) To become a statutory employee three conditions must be met: 1. The work was performed under a contract; 2. The injury must have occurred on or about the premises of the employer; 3. The injury must have occurred while performing work normally done in the usual course of business of the employer. Miller v. Municipal Theatre Ass'n of St. Louis (A.), 540 S.W.2d 899. (1987) Claimant who was injured while repairing the public address system for racetrack was not an employee under this section entitled to benefits since work performed was not done in furtherance of the usual operation of the racetrack. Rouge v. St. Charles Speedway, 733 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App.).
287.060. Every employer and every employee, except as in this chapter otherwise provided, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter and respectively to furnish and accept compensation as herein provided. (RSMo 1939 § 3690, A.L. 1953 p. 535, A.L. 1965 p. 397, A.L. 1974 S.B. 417) Prior revision: 1929 § 3300
287.061. 1. Any city or county which issues an occupational or business license for a contractor in the construction industry shall require a certificate of insurance for workers' compensation coverage or an affidavit, the form of which shall be developed by the division, signed by the applicant attesting that the contractor is exempt. No city or county shall have the duty to investigate any certificate of insurance or affidavit filed pursuant to this section. 2. Any contractor who fails to comply with the provisions of subsection 1 of this section shall be denied such a license until he or she furnishes a certificate of insurance. 3. It is unlawful, pursuant to section 287.128, for any contractor to provide fraudulent information pursuant to this section. 4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to create or constitute a liability to or a cause of action against a city or county in regard to the issuance of any license pursuant to this section. (L. 1993 S.B. 251 § 15, A.L. 1998 H.B. 1237, et al.)
287.063. 1. An employee shall be conclusively deemed to have been exposed to the hazards of an occupational disease when for any length of time, however short, he is employed in an occupation or process in which the hazard of the disease exists, subject to the provisions relating to occupational disease due to repetitive motion, as is set forth in subsection 7 of section 287.067, RSMo. 2. The employer liable for the compensation in this section provided shall be the employer in whose employment the employee was last exposed to the hazard of the occupational disease for which claim is made regardless of the length of time of such last exposure. 3. The statute of limitation referred to in section 287.430 shall not begin to run in cases of occupational disease until it becomes reasonably discoverable and apparent that a compensable injury has been sustained, except that in cases of loss of hearing due to industrial noise said limitation shall not begin to run until the employee is eligible to file a claim as hereinafter provided in section 287.197. (L. 1959 S.B. 167 § 287.201, A.L. 1974 S.B. 417, A.L. 1983 H.B. 243 & 260, A.L. 1993 S.B. 251) (2002) Even though claimant's repetitive motion symptoms originated with prior employers, under last exposure rule the last employer to expose claimant is solely liable for such occupational diseases. Endicott v. Display Technologies, Inc., 77 S.W.3d 612 (Mo.banc).
287.067. 1. In this chapter the term "occupational disease" is hereby defined to mean, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, an identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except where the diseases follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this section. The disease need not to have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence. 2. An occupational disease is compensable if it is clearly work related and meets the requirements of an injury which is compensable as provided in subsections 2 and 3 of section 287.020. An occupational disease is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor. 3. "Loss of hearing due to industrial noise" is recognized as an occupational disease for purposes of this chapter and is hereby defined to be a loss of hearing in one or both ears due to prolonged exposure to harmful noise in employment. "Harmful noise" means sound capable of producing occupational deafness. 4. "Radiation disability" is recognized as an occupational disease for purposes of this chapter and is hereby defined to be that disability due to radioactive properties or substances or to Roentgen rays (X rays) or exposure to ionizing radiation caused by any process involving the use of or direct contact with radium or radioactive properties or substances or the use of or direct exposure to Roentgen rays (X rays) or ionizing radiation. 5. Disease of the lungs or respiratory tract, hypotension, hypertension, or disease of the heart or cardiovascular system, including carcinoma, may be recognized as occupational diseases for the purposes of this chapter and are defined to be disability due to exposure to smoke, gases, carcinogens, inadequate oxygen, or psychological stress of firefighters of a paid fire department if a direct causal relationship is established. 6. Any employee who is exposed to and contracts any contagious or communicable disease arising out of and in the course of his or her employment shall be eligible for benefits under this chapter as an occupational disease. 7. With regard to occupational disease due to repetitive motion, if the exposure to the repetitive motion which is found to be the cause of the injury is for a period of less than three months and the evidence demonstrates that the exposure to the repetitive motion with a prior employer was the substantial contributing factor to the injury, the prior employer shall be liable for such occupational disease. (L. 1959 S.B. 167 § 287.201, A.L. 1980 H.B. 1396, A.L. 1983 H.B. 243 & 260, A.L. 1987 H.B. 564, A.L. 1993 S.B. 251) (1972) Whether a disease is occupational is not to be determined by whether the disease is literally peculiar to an occupation, but whether there is a recognizable link between the disease and some distinctive feature of the claimant's job which is common to all jobs of that sort. Collins v. Neevel Luggage Manufacturing Company (A.), 481 S.W.2d 548. (1972) A disease is "occupational" if there is a recognizable link between the disease and a distinctive feature of the claimant's job which is common to all jobs of that sort. Gaddis v. Rudy Patrick Seed Division (Mo.), 485 S.W.2d 636. (1987) Doctor's testimony and other evidence that dust in workplace was predominant cause of claimant's pneumonia and lack of evidence that pneumonia was preexisting condition of nonoccupational origin or caused by factors unrelated to work supported finding that claimant suffered from occupational disease as defined in this section. Sheehan v. Springfield Seed and Floral, 733 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. App.). (1997) "Substantial contributing factor" means that factor which is the more responsible of the two contributing factors. Mayfield v. Brown Shoe Co., 941 S.W.2d 31 (Mo.App. S.D.). (2002) Claimant is not required to notify employer of sustaining occupational disease caused by repetitive motion during previous employment, and statutory exception to last exposure rule does not apply if claimant's exposure to repetitive motion with current employer is for more than three months. Endicott v. Display Technologies, Inc., 77 S.W.3d 612 (Mo.banc).
287.070. Disease of the lungs or respiratory tract or disease of the heart or cardiovascular system, including carcinoma, may be recognized as occupational diseases for the purposes of chapter 287, and are defined to be disability due to exposure to smoke, gases, or inadequate oxygen, for peace officers certified pursuant to chapter 590, RSMo, or any person assisting in the cleanup or disposal if a direct causal relationship is established to exposure to an illegal controlled substance manufacturing laboratory. (L. 1998 H.B. 1147, et al. § 6)
287.090. 1. This chapter shall not apply to: (1) Employment of farm labor, domestic servants in a private home, including family chauffeurs, or occasional labor performed for and related to a private household; (2) Qualified real estate agents and direct sellers as those terms are defined in Section 3508 of Title 26 United States Code; (3) Employment where the person employed is an inmate confined in a state prison, penitentiary or county or municipal jail, or a patient or resident in a state mental health facility, and the labor or services of such inmate, patient, or resident are exclusively on behalf of the state, county or municipality having custody of said inmate, patient, or resident. Nothing in this subdivision is intended to exempt employment where the inmate, patient or resident was hired by a state, county or municipal government agency after direct competition with persons who are not inmates, patients or residents and the compensation for the position of employment is not contingent upon or affected by the worker's status as an inmate, patient or resident; (4) Volunteers of a tax-exempt organization which operates under the standards of Section 501(c)(3) of the federal Internal Revenue Code, where such volunteers are not paid wages, but provide services purely on a charitable and voluntary basis; (5) Persons providing services as adjudicators, sports officials, or contest workers for interscholastic activities programs or similar amateur youth programs who are not otherwise employed by the sponsoring school, association of schools or nonprofit tax-exempt organization sponsoring the amateur youth programs. 2. Any employer exempted from this chapter as to the employer or as to any class of employees of the employer pursuant to the provisions of subdivision (3) of subsection 1 of section 287.030 or pursuant to subsection 1 of this section may elect coverage as to the employer or as to the class of employees of that employer pursuant to this chapter by purchasing and accepting a valid workers' compensation insurance policy or endorsement, or by written notice to the group self-insurer of which the employer is a member. The election shall take effect on the effective date of the workers' compensation insurance policy or endorsement, or by written notice to the group self-insurer of which the employer is a member, and continue while such policy or endorsement remains in effect or until further written notice to the group self-insurer of which the employer is a member. Any such exempt employer or employer with an exempt class of employees may withdraw such election by the cancellation or nonrenewal of the workers' compensation insurance policy or endorsement, or by written notice to the group self-insurer of which the employer is a member. In the event the employer is electing out of coverage as to the employer, the cancellation shall take effect on the later date of the cancellation of the policy or the filing of notice pursuant to subsection 3 of this section. 3. Any insurance company authorized to write insurance under the provisions of this chapter in this state shall file with the division a memorandum on a form prescribed by the division of any workers' compensation policy issued to any employer and of any renewal or cancellation thereof. 4. The mandatory coverage sections of this chapter shall not apply to the employment of any member of a family owning a family farm corporation as defined in section 350.010, RSMo, or to the employment of any salaried officer of a family farm corporation organized pursuant to the laws of this state, but such family members and officers of such family farm corporations may be covered under a policy of workers' compensation insurance if approved by a resolution of the board of directors. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to apply to any other type of corporation other than a family farm corporation. 5. A corporation may withdraw from the provisions of this chapter, when there are no more than two owners of the corporation who are also the only employees of the corporation, by filing with the division notice of election to be withdrawn. The election shall take effect and continue from the date of filing with the division by the corporation of the notice of withdrawal from liability under this chapter. Any corporation making such an election may withdraw its election by filing with the division a notice to withdraw the election, which shall take effect thirty days after the date of the filing, or at such later date as may be specified in the notice of withdrawal. (RSMo 1939 § 3693, A.L. 1957 p. 579, A.L. 1965 p. 397, A.L. 1971 S.B. 163, A.L. 1974 S.B. 417, A.L. 1978 H.B. 1260, A.L. 1980 H.B. 1396, A.L. 1981 H.B. 324, A.L. 1983 H.B. 243 & 260, A.L. 1987 S.B. 261, A.L. 1988 H.B. 1073, A.L. 1993 S.B. 251, A.L. 1998 H.B. 1237, et al.) Prior revision: 1929 § 3303 (1998) Statute does not require that insurer file as a prerequisite to cancellation of a policy. Simpson v. Dale E. Saunchegrow Const., 965 S.W.2d 899 (Mo.App. S.D.).
287.100. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as amending or repealing any statute or ordinance relating to associations or funds for the relief, pension, retirement, or other benefit of firemen, policemen, or other public employees, their widows, children or dependents, or as in any manner interfering with such associations, funds or benefits, now or hereafter established, but any such public employees, his widow, children or dependents, who shall receive compensation under this chapter shall have deducted from any benefit otherwise payable by any pension or other benefit fund to which the municipal corporation or other public employer contributes, a part of such benefit proportionate to the amount then being contributed to such fund by such employer, which deductions shall be made only during the compensation period. Nor shall anything in this chapter be construed as interfering with the right of any public employee to draw full wages, or collect and retain his full fees, so long as he holds his office, appointment or employment, but the period during which the same are received after the injury shall be deducted from the period of compensation payments due hereunder. (RSMo 1939 § 3696) Prior revision: 1929 § 3306 (1982) Applying workers' compensation law to constitutional charter city did not violate provision of Article VI, Section 22 prescribing enactment of laws creating or fixing powers, duties or compensation of any municipal office or employment. City of St. Louis v. Grimes (Mo.), 630 S.W.2d 82.
287.110. 1. This chapter shall apply to all cases within its provisions except those exclusively covered by any federal law. 2. This chapter shall apply to all injuries received and occupational diseases contracted in this state, regardless of where the contract of employment was made, and also to all injuries received and occupational diseases contracted outside of this state under contract of employment made in this state, unless the contract of employment in any case shall otherwise provide, and also to all injuries received and occupational diseases contracted outside of this state where the employee's employment was principally localized in this state. (RSMo 1939 § 3700, A.L. 1974 S.B. 417) Prior revision: 1929 § 3310 (1977) Despite policy provision excluding coverage on accidents occurring outside Missouri, Workmen's Compensation Law applies and insurer is liable on accidents occurring outside of state where contract of employment was made in state. Payne v. St. Louis Grain Corp. (A.), 562 S.W.2d 102. (1986) A choice of law provision in an employment contract may be disregarded in workers' compensation cases. Miller v. Hirschbach Motor Lines, Inc., 714 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. App.). (1993) Where Missouri statute specifically precludes recovery for work-related injuries if injuries are exclusively covered by any federal law, injuries sustained by dredge operator were recoverable under federal Jones Act which provides for personal injury suffered by any seaman in course of his employment; therefore, any amount received by plaintiff under workers' compensation was recoverable by insurer. Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. McKinnon, 10 F.3d 1352 (8th Cir.).
287.120. 1. Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and shall be released from all other liability therefor whatsoever, whether to the employee or any other person. The term "accident" as used in this section shall include, but not be limited to, injury or death of the employee caused by the unprovoked violence or assault against the employee by any person. 2. The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his wife, her husband, parents, personal representatives, dependents, heirs or next kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such accidental injury or death, except such rights and remedies as are not provided for by this chapter. 3. No compensation shall be allowed under this chapter for the injury or death due to the employee's intentional self-inflicted injury, but the burden of proof of intentional self-inflicted injury shall be on the employer or the person contesting the claim for allowance. 4. Where the injury is caused by the failure of the employer to comply with any statute in this state or any lawful order of the division or the commission, the compensation and death benefit provided for under this chapter shall be increased fifteen percent. 5. Where the injury is caused by the willful failure of the employee to use safety devices where provided by the employer, or from the employee's failure to obey any reasonable rule adopted by the employer for the safety of employees, which rule has been kept posted in a conspicuous place on the employer's premises, the compensation and death benefit provided for herein shall be reduced fifteen percent; provided, that it is shown that the employee had actual knowledge of the rule so adopted by the employer; and provided, further, that the employer had, prior to the injury, made a diligent effort to cause his employees to use the safety device or devices and to obey or follow the rule so adopted for the safety of the employees. 6. (1) Where the employee fails to obey any rule or policy adopted by the employer relating to the use of alcohol or nonprescribed controlled drugs in the workplace, which rule or policy has been kept posted in a conspicuous place on the employer's premises, the compensation and death benefit provided for herein shall be reduced fifteen percent if the injury was sustained in conjunction with the use of alcohol or nonprescribed controlled drugs; provided, that it is shown that the employee had actual knowledge of the rules or policy so adopted by the employer and, provided further that the employer had, prior to the injury, made a diligent effort to inform the employee of the requirement to obey any reasonable rule or policy adopted by the employer. (2) If, however, the use of alcohol or nonprescribed controlled drugs in violation of the employer's rule or policy which is posted and publicized as set forth in subdivision (1) is the proximate cause of the injury, then the benefits or compensation otherwise payable under this chapter for death or disability shall be forfeited. The forfeiture of benefits or compensation shall not apply when: (a) The employer has actual knowledge of the employee's use of the alcohol or nonprescribed controlled drugs and in the face thereof fails to take any recuperative or disciplinary action; or (b) As part of the employee's employment, he is authorized by the employer to use such alcohol or nonprescribed controlled drugs. 7. Where the employee's participation in a voluntary recreational activity or program is the proximate cause of the injury, benefits or compensation otherwise payable under this chapter for death or disability shall be forfeited regardless that the employer may have promoted, sponsored or supported the recreational activity or program, expressly or impliedly, in whole or in part. The forfeiture of benefits or compensation shall not apply when: (a) The employee was directly ordered by the employer to participate in such recreational activity or program; (b) The employee was paid wages or travel expenses while participating in such recreational activity or program; or (c) The injury from such recreational activity or program occurs on the employer's premises due to an unsafe condition and the employer had actual knowledge of the employee's participation in the recreational activity or program and of the unsafe condition of the premises and failed to either curtail the recreational activity or program or cure the unsafe condition. 8. Mental injury resulting from work related stress does not arise out of and in the course of the employment, unless it is demonstrated that the stress is work related and was extraordinary and unusual. The amount of work stress shall be measured by objective standards and actual events. 9. A mental injury is not considered to arise out of and in the course of the employment if it resulted from any disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion, termination or any similar action taken in good faith by the employer. 10. The ability of a firefighter to receive benefits for psychological stress under section 287.067 shall not be diminished by the provisions of subsections 8 and 9 of this section. (RSMo 1939 § 3691, A.L. 1965 p. 397, A.L. 1969 H.B. 367, A.L. 1974 S.B. 417, A.L. 1978 H.B. 1260, A.L. 1990 S.B. 751, A.L. 1992 H.B. 975) Prior revision: 1929 § 3301 *Words between *....* were inadvertently omitted from original rolls, an apparent typographical error. Accident, Injury (1975) Held that slowly pouring concrete from a bucket held extended from the body was an unusual strain which caused a heart attack and was an accident within the meaning of this section. Smith v. Plaster (A.), 518 S.W.2d 692. (1975) Shooting of laundry deliveryman by berserk gunman while in course of making a delivery is a compensable accident. Allen v. Dorothy's Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co. (A.), 523 S.W.2d 874. (1975) Held that acid thrown in service station employee's face by husband who believed there was improper familiarity between victim and acid thrower's wife was not an assault which would qualify as a compensable "accident". Freeman v. Callow (A.), 525 S.W.2d 371. Arising Out of and in the Course of Employment (1972) Employee who was struck by lightning while standing in flat open field as tallest grounded object was exposed to greater hazard than general public, thus accident arose out of decedent's employment. Reich v. A. Reich and Sons Gardens, Inc. (Mo.), 485 S.W.2d 133. (1974) Employee injured on parkway of public street while returning to work from place where she took her meal was not compensable. Spacy v. Stout's Feed and Supply (A.), 512 S.W.2d 849. (1998) Injuries which occur while traveling to and from medical treatment for prior compensation injuries do not arise out of and in the course of employment and, as such, are not compensable. Bear v. Anson Implement Inc., 976 S.W.2d 553 (W.D.Mo.), transfer denied. (1998) The Division of Workers' Compensation has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over claims of medical malpractice for post-accident injuries alleged to be caused by treatment of an injury falling under the purview of workers' compensation law because such claims are sufficiently work-related to arise out of and in the course of employment. Burns v. Employer Health Services, Inc., 976 S.W.2d 639 (W.D.Mo.). Death (2002) Three hundred week requirement of subsection 4 does not violate equal protection; requirement is rationally related to legitimate state interest of having such claims adjudicated while causative factors could be reasonably determined. Greenlee v. Dukes Plastering Service, 75 S.W.3d 273 (Mo.banc). Exclusive Remedy (1980) Exclusive remedy of parents of deceased worker for compensation for alleged wrongful death of worker in employment accident under Workers' Compensation Law; overruling Miller v. Hotel Savoy Co. (A.), 68 S.W.2d 929. Combs v. City of Maryville (A.), 609 S.W.2d 475. (1984) Exclusive remedy provision of Workers' Compensation Act is not a bar to a common law action against a parent or subsidiary corporation of the plaintiff's immediate employer. Boswell v. May Centers, Inc. (Mo. App.), 669 S.W.2d 585. (2002) Allegation of negligent driving by a co-employee is no more than allegation of a breach of the duty to maintain a safe working environment, and thus exclusive remedy provisions control. State ex rel. Taylor v. Wallace, 73 S.W.3d 620 (Mo.banc). (2002) Section's exclusive liability provisions do not apply to provisions of Overhead Power Line Safety Act, sections 319.075 to 319.090, RSMo. State ex rel. Safety Roofing Systems, Inc. v. Crawford, 86 S.W.3d 488 (Mo.App. S.D.). Third Party Actions (1985) An employer is not subject to third-party actions for contribution or assessment of fault with respect to an employee's accident covered under the Workers' Compensation Act. Redford v. R.A.F., Corp., 615 F.Supp. 547 (D.C.Mo.). (1987) While assaults arising from personal quarrels are not compensable under Workers' Compensation, unprovoked assaults are compensable. Olivio v. TLI, Inc., 731 S.W.2d 395 (Mo. App.). (1989) Female employee precluded from bringing action against employer for its alleged negligence in retaining supervisor and in failing to maintain safe work place, because alleged sexual assault occurred when employee was working overtime and was discussing business over a drink in supervisor's office and was incident arising "in the course of" and "out of" female employee's employment. (Mo.App.) Crofts v. Harrison, 772 S.W.2d 901. (1989) Where contract required subcontractor to defend and indemnify general contractor in claims arising out of performance of the contract, workers' compensation statute does not shield subcontractor from liability for breach of independent contractual duty to indemnify general contractor. U.S. v. Fru-Con Construction Corp. (8th Cir.) 890 F.2d 1046. (1991) Workers' compensation statutes do not bar an action by a third party for indemnity against an employer when employer breaches an independent duty or obligation to third party. Independent duty of due care is created when employer participates in design of machinery in intrusive or specific way and constitutes an exception to the exclusive remedy of workers' compensation statutes. Coello v. Tug Manufacturing Corp., 756 F.Supp. (W.D. Mo.). (1996) Claimant must show that injury arises out of and in the course of employment in order to recover. Recovery is allowed only where a condition unique to or exacerbated by the workplace exists and contributes to cause the injury. Abel v. Mike Russell's Standard Service, 924 S.W.2d 502 (Mo.banc). (1996) Statute's exclusivity provision does not bar recovery of damages under the Missouri Human Rights Act. Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir.).
287.123. 1. Each insurance carrier writing workers' compensation insurance in this state shall establish a program whereby the carrier shall have available and shall provide to each employer obtaining workers' compensation coverage from such insurance carrier comprehensive safety engineering and management services upon a request made by the employer for such services. 2. Each insurance carrier writing workers' compensation insurance in this state shall provide the director of the department of labor and industrial relations with a written outline of the safety engineering and management program required to be established under subsection 1 of this section. Such program required to be established pursuant to subsection 1 of this section shall require certification by the director as to its adequacy in providing safety management and loss control to the employer. An insurance carrier's program required to be established pursuant to subsection 1 of this section shall be reviewed by the director at least annually to determine that it is delivering comprehensive services for safety education and the elimination of and protection against unsafe acts in the workplace and frequently recognized compensable worker injuries. An insurance carrier may establish such program required to be established pursuant to subsection 1 of this section through contracts with private safety engineering and management service companies in the state. Each insurance carrier shall collect annual data on what impact its program required to be established pursuant to subsection 1 of this section has had on compensable losses of the employers it insures, and such data shall be made available to the department of insurance and the department of labor and industrial relations. When the employer requests services under such program and the insurance carrier provides such services, the insurance carrier shall report such services to the division. 3. At each time the division of workers' compensation receives notice from an employer that the employer has purchased workers' compensation insurance coverage from a different insurance carrier or has made an initial purchase of workers' compensation coverage, the division shall notify the employer in writing of publicly or privately administered worker safety programs available in the state, unless such notice has been given in the prior twelve months. 4. The division shall maintain a registry of safety consultants and safety engineers certified by the department of labor and industrial relations and such registry shall be available for inspection by any employer in this state. Standards and requirements for certificates of safety consultants and safety engineers shall be determined by the department of labor and industrial relations by rule. (L. 1993 S.B. 251, A.L. 1998 H.B. 1237, et al., A.L. 2001 S.B. 521)
287.124. The department of labor and industrial relations shall complete all applications filed prior to January 1, 1994, from employers for certification of employer safety programs. (L. 1993 S.B. 251 § 36) Effective 1-1-94
287.126. The division of workers' compensation shall establish a toll-free number for employees injured on the job to provide information regarding employees' rights, obligations and benefits under the Missouri workers' compensation law. Such number shall be accessible during normal business hours and shall be answered by personnel of the division of workers' compensation adequately trained to respond to such inquiries. (L. 1992 H.B. 975)
287.127. 1. Beginning January 1, 1993, all employers shall post a notice at their place of employment, in a sufficient number of places on the premises to assure that such notice will reasonably be seen by all employees. An employer for whom services are performed by individuals who may not reasonably be expected to see a posted notice shall notify each such employee in writing of the contents of such notice. The notice shall include: (1) That the employer is operating under and subject to the provisions of the Missouri workers' compensation law; (2) That employees must report all injuries immediately to the employer by advising the employer personally, the employer's designated individual or the employee's immediate boss, supervisor or foreman and that the employee may lose the right to receive compensation if the injury or illness is not reported within thirty days or in the case of occupational illness or disease, within thirty days of the time he or she is reasonably aware of work relatedness of the injury or illness; (3) The name, address and telephone number of the insurer, if insured. If self-insured, the name, address and telephone number of the employer's designated individual responsible for reporting injuries or the name, address and telephone number of the adjusting company or service company designated by the employer to handle workers' compensation matters; (4) The name, address and the toll-free telephone number of the division of workers' compensation; (5) That the employer will supply, upon request, additional information provided by the division of workers' compensation; (6) That a fraudulent action by the employer, employee or any other person is unlawful. 2. The division of workers' compensation shall develop the notice to be posted and shall distribute such notice free of charge to employers and insurers upon request. Failure to request such notice does not relieve the employer of its obligation to post the notice. If the employer carries workers' compensation insurance, the carrier shall provide the notice to the insured within thirty days of the insurance policy's inception date. 3. Any employer who willfully violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months or by both such fine and imprisonment, and each such violation or each day such violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense. (L. 1992 H.B. 975)
287.128. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to: (1) Knowingly present or cause to be presented any false or fraudulent claim for the payment of benefits pursuant to a workers' compensation claim; (2) Knowingly present multiple claims for the same occurrence with intent to defraud; (3) Purposefully prepare, make or subscribe to any writing with intent to present or use the same, or to allow it to be presented in support of any false or fraudulent claim; (4) Knowingly assist, abet, solicit or conspire with: (a) Any person who knowingly presents any false or fraudulent claim for the payment of benefits; (b) Any person who knowingly presents multiple claims for the same occurrence with an intent to defraud; or (c) Any person who purposefully prepares, makes or subscribes to any writing with the intent to present or use the same, or to allow it to be presented in support of any such claim; (5) Knowingly make or cause to be made any false or fraudulent claim for payment of a health care benefit; (6) Knowingly submit a claim for a health care benefit which was not used by, or on behalf of, the claimant; (7) Knowingly present multiple claims for payment of the same health care benefit with an intent to defraud; (8) Knowingly make or cause to be made any false or fraudulent material statement or material representation for the purpose of obtaining or denying any benefit; (9) Knowingly make or cause to be made any false or fraudulent statements with regard to entitlement to benefits with the intent to discourage an injured worker from making a legitimate claim. For the purposes of subdivisions (8) and (9) of this subsection, the term "statement" includes any notice, proof of injury, bill for services, payment for services, hospital or doctor records, X ray or test results. 2. It shall be unlawful for any insurance company or self-insurer in this state to: (1) Intentionally refuse to comply with known and legally indisputable compensation obligations; (2) Discharge or administer compensation obligations in a dishonest manner; and (3) Discharge or administer compensation obligations in such a manner as to cause injury to the public or those persons dealing with the employer or insurer. 3. Any person violating any of the provisions of subsections 1 and 2 of this section or section 287.129, shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor and, in addition, shall be liable to the state of Missouri for a fine not to exceed ten thousand dollars or double the value of the fraud whichever is greater. Any person who has previously pled guilty to or has been found guilty of violating any of the provisions of subsections 1 and 2 of this section or the provisions of section 287.129 and who subsequently violates any of the provisions of subsections 1 and 2 of this section or the provisions of section 287.129 shall be guilty of a class D felony. 4. Any person who knowingly misrepresents any fact in order to obtain workers' compensation insurance at less than the proper rate for that insurance shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Any person who has previously pled guilty to or has been found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this section or the provisions of section 287.129 and who subsequently violates any of the provisions of this section or the provisions of section 287.129 shall be guilty of a class D felony. 5. Any employer failing to insure his liability pursuant to this chapter shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor and, in addition, shall be liable to the state of Missouri for a penalty in an amount equal to twice the annual premium the employer would have paid had such employer been insured or twenty-five thousand dollars, whichever amount is greater. Any person who has previously pled guilty to or has been found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this section or the provisions of section 287.129 and who subsequently violates any of the provisions of this section or the provisions of section 287.129 shall be guilty of a class D felony. 6. Any person may file a complaint alleging fraud or noncompliance with this chapter with a legal advisor in the division of workers' compensation. The legal advisor shall refer the complaint to the fraud and noncompliance unit within the division. The unit shall investigate all complaints and present any finding of fraud or noncompliance to the director, who may refer the file to the attorney general. The attorney general may prosecute any fraud or noncompliance associated with this chapter. All costs incurred by the attorney general associated with any investigation and prosecution pursuant to this subsection shall be paid out of the workers' compensation fund. Any fines or penalties levied and received as a result of any prosecution under this section shall be paid to the workers' compensation fund. Any restitution ordered as a part of the judgment shall be paid to the person or persons who were defrauded. 7. There is hereby established in the division of workers' compensation a fraud and noncompliance administrative unit responsible for investigating incidences of fraud and failure to comply with the provisions of this chapter. (L. 1992 H.B. 975, A.L. 1993 S.B. 251, A.L. 1998 H.B. 1237, et al.) (2003) Statutory penalty is premised upon the guilt of employer for failure to insure workers' compensation liability and not upon the sentencing of the employer. State ex rel. v. Jamison, 103 S.W.3d 836 (Mo.App. E.D.).
287.129. 1. A health care provider commits a fraudulent workers' compensation insurance act if he knowingly and with intent to defraud presents, causes to be presented, or prepares with knowledge or belief that it will be presented, to or by an insurer, purported insurer, broker, or any agent thereof, any claim for payment or other benefit which involves any one or more of the following false billing practices: (1) "Unbundling" an insurance claim by claiming a number of medical procedures were performed instead of a single comprehensive procedure; (2) "Upcoding" a medical, hospital or rehabilitative insurance claim by claiming that a more serious or extensive procedure was performed than was actually performed; (3) "Exploding" a medical, hospital or rehabilitative insurance claim by claiming a series of tests were performed on a single sample of blood, urine, or other bodily fluid, when actually the series of tests were part of one battery of tests; or (4) "Duplicating" a medical, hospital or rehabilitative insurance claim made by a health care provider by resubmitting the claim through another health care provider in which the original health care provider has an ownership interest. Nothing in this section shall prohibit providers from making good faith efforts to ensure that claims for reimbursement are coded to reflect the proper diagnosis and treatment. 2. If, by its own inquiries or as a result of complaints, the department of insurance has reason to believe that a person has engaged in, or is engaging in, any fraudulent workers' compensation insurance act contained in this section, it may administer oaths and affirmations, serve subpoenas ordering the attendance of witnesses or proffering of matter, and collect evidence. 3. If the matter that the department of insurance seeks to obtain by request is located outside the state, the person so requested may make it available to the division or its representative to examine the matter at the place where it is located. The department may designate representatives, including officials of the state in which the matter is located, to inspect the matter on its behalf, and it may respond to similar requests from officials of other states. (L. 1993 S.B. 251)
287.130. If the injury or death occurs while the employee is in the joint service of two or more employers, their liability shall be joint and several, and the employee may hold any or all of such employers. As between themselves such employers shall have contribution from each other in the proportion of their several liability for the wages of such employee but nothing in this chapter shall prevent such employers from making a different distribution of their proportionate contributions as between themselves. (RSMo 1939 § 3697) Prior revision: 1929 § 3307 |