PIERCING THE VEIL OF SECRECY IN HIV/AIDS AND OTHER SEXUALLY
TRANSMITTED DISEASES: THEORIES OF PRIVACY AND DISCLOSURE IN PARTNER
NOTIFICATION
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN*
JAMES G. HODGE, JR.
Part 1
Section:
1
2
3
http://www.law.duke.edu/
I. INTRODUCTION
At least since their appearance in
Western Europe in the late fifteenth century,1
sexually-transmitted diseases (STDs), or "venereal diseases" as they
were once called,2 have been characterized by a
remarkable paradox. Despite their endemic nature in Europe and North
America, STDs were, and still are, a "secret malady."3
Persons have endeavored to keep their sexually-transmitted
infections hidden from the social world -- from their sexual
partners, families, and communities. At the same time, prevailing
social mores have kept STDs from [*pg
11] the public consciousness and consequently have prevented
STDs from receiving public action and effective intervention.
Secrecy nurtures disease because it
provides an environment conducive to the spread of infection. Where
the social construction of sexuality and disease condones secrecy,
sex partners are unaware of the risks,4 and public health
authorities cannot track the epidemic in order to positively
intervene. Not surprisingly, one of the earliest recorded public
health strategies for STD prevention was to pierce the veil of
secrecy surrounding these hidden diseases by notifying sexual
partners ("contacts") of infected patients ("index" cases).5
Sexual "contact tracing" was supported by the moral theory that
sexual partners could take precautions and seek medical treatment if
the risk of infection was disclosed.6 Once the risks of
infection were identified, the incidence of STD infection would
decline suggestively as infected persons reduced behaviors that
placed them at risk for disease.7
Sexual contact tracing probably was
practiced years before it became a formal means of STD control.8
Originating from the reglementation9 of European
prostitutes, the earliest reference to contact tracing in contagious
disease law dates to the mid-nineteenth century in Europe10
and to the 1930s in the United States.11 Buttressed by
federal financial support and a decade of state STD laws, "contact
epidemiology" became a central public health strategy in America to
combat the syphilis epidemic.12 The development of a cure
for the disease, penicillin,13 in the early 1940s led,
however, to significant reductions in the incidence
[*pg 12] of syphilis. The
effectiveness of contact tracing as a public health practice
therefore largely remained unknown despite moral support for the
concept.
From its widespread use during the
1930s, the notification of sexual partners (with the assistance of
public health authorities) remained an accepted part of the law and
practice of STD control throughout this century.14 This
concept of tracking sexual contacts would later be called "partner
notification." Recently, the concept of partner notification has
expanded to formally include a range of services such as counseling
and medical treatment, in addition to notification. Consequently, a
preferred terminology has evolved -- "partner notification support
services" (PNSS).15
In instances where contact tracing
did not traditionally apply, legal reform, driven by moral
justifications and based on theories of tort law, imposed duties on
certain persons, generally infected persons and health care workers
(HCWs), to notify others of the risk of contracting an STD. Often
known collectively as the "duty to warn," these judicially-imposed,
common law obligations subsequently have been codified by many state
legislatures.16 The affirmative "duty to warn" is
comprised of two obligations based on distinct legal foundations:
(1) the duty of infected persons to disclose to partners the risk of
exposure; and (2) the duty of health care professionals to warn
partners of harm resulting from exposure to infected patients.
The social construction of disease,
particularly STDs, perceptively changed during the HIV/AIDS epidemic17
of the 1980s and 1990s. Infected persons (and, to a certain extent,
public health authorities) questioned the theories of disclosure and
protection that justified partner notification. During the AIDS
epidemic, secrecy and individual privacy reemerged as the prevailing
social construct of public health, much as it was in the early days
of the syphilis epidemic. As Susan Sontag writes, "More than cancer,
but rather like syphilis, AIDS seems to foster ominous fantasies
about a disease that is a marker of both individual and social
vulnerabilities."18 Within this context, partner
notification has been challenged as an acceptable public health
practice or legally-imposed duty, at
[*pg 13] least as it relates to a disease like HIV/AIDS,
which is deeply private, socially stigmatizing, and medically
incurable.19
In truth, partner notification,
whether applied to traditional STDs or to HIV/AIDS, is a highly
complex concept that cannot be understood without careful
consideration of related issues of public health, ethics, economics,
and law. Partner notification has deep roots in the historical,
legal, and philosophical heritage of America. To public health
practitioners, the traditional practice of partner notification,
with its widespread, persistent, and systematic use over time,
justifies its continued implementation. Why then, it is often asked,
does society refrain from fully utilizing one of the most
well-established public health interventions in the HIV/AIDS
epidemic?20 Under this perspective, failure to pursue
aggressively partner notification demonstrates how civil liberties
have trumped privacy in HIV/AIDS policy. These arguments, however,
assume that partner notification is effective and that syphilis and
HIV/AIDS are truly analogous diseases.
Despite the use of partner
notification in all of its forms, it has not been systematically
examined from legal, ethical, empirical, and economic perspectives.
Based on this analytical examination, it is apparent that although
partner notification is well-grounded in the legal and moral
traditions of America, there exists a scarcity of empirical and
economic evidence demonstrating its cost-effectiveness.
Consequently, alternative models are needed for STD prevention and
control that are both effective and protective of individual
liberties and privacy. In particular, a model of "social network
analysis" that promises to inform those at risk of HIV through
focused counseling and education may be warranted.
Part I explores the various meanings of partner notification within
their historical and legal foundations. Because partner notification
has been used to describe quite different kinds of intervention, the
concept has created policy confusion. Contact tracing, the patient's
duty to disclose, and the health care professional's duty to warn
are described as a prerequisite to a more detailed ethical,
economic, and public health analysis. Part II examines the legal
interests involved with partner notification, particularly contact
tracing. The governmental interests for contact tracing are
discussed by framing the constitutional and statutory justifications
for contact tracing from the state and federal perspectives.
Arguments concerning an infected individual's constitutional,
statutory, and common law interests in privacy are discussed along
with anti-discrimination protections for persons infected with STDs
-- particularly those infected with HIV. These interests, while
important, do not negate the power of government to implement
partner notification. Part III broadens the systematic evaluation,
exploring partner notification from normative and consequentialist
perspectives. One of the powerful reasons to support partner
notification may not necessarily be public health effectiveness, but
simply an ethical claim that persons should be
[*pg 14] informed about sexual
risks despite infringements on the autonomy of infected persons.
Principles of feminism suggest that women should be informed of
demonstrable risks to their health and empowered to protect
themselves. Part IV evaluates the accumulated empirical data about
the efficacy of partner notification, looking at how successful this
intervention has been, under what circumstances it is likely to be
most effective, and whether its effectiveness in a particular
setting supports its efficacy as a national practice. Partner
notification also is evaluated from an economic perspective. The
costs of partner notification in comparison with other public health
interventions are analyzed, as well as the likelihood that the
practice creates incentives or disincentives for avoidance of risk
behavior, promotion of healthy behavior, and access to treatment.
Finally, Part V proposes alternative models for partner
notification. In conclusion, a "social network analysis" is
supported as part of a comprehensive prevention strategy for STDs
and HIV/AIDS. This alternative approach can achieve public health
objectives with less intrusion on personal liberty and privacy.
II. THE THREE MEANINGS OF PARTNER NOTIFICATION: FROM CONTACT TRACING
TO THE DUTIES TO DISCLOSE AND WARN
Partner notification is a highly
complex concept. While often simplified to denote the notification
of persons who are at risk of becoming infected with a disease,
partner notification has at least three distinct, if at times
overlapping, meanings: (1) contact tracing; (2) the duty of infected
persons to disclose their infection to a sexual partner; and (3) the
duty of health care providers to warn of sexual and other risks to
the partners of their infected patients.
Contact tracing, whose origins can
be traced to the reglementation of prostitutes in sixteenth century
Europe, is characteristically a governmental responsibility
undertaken by public health authorities. The health department
typically interviews an infected patient, called the "index case,"
who voluntarily discloses the names and locations of past and
present sexual partners. These contacts are then located -- traced
-- when possible to notify them of their potential exposure to
infection. The partner is not informed of the name of the index case
by health authorities in an attempt to preserve the confidentiality
of the index case. Medical treatment and personal counseling often
are offered to contacts at the time of notification. For those
persons who are infected, the process is regenerated to determine
additional contacts. The principal objective of contact tracing is
to reduce disease transmission by locating and containing the spread
of a given STD within a certain population.21 It seeks to
break the chain of transmission by identifying sources through which
others in a given population have become infected. In addition, it
should stem the tide of new infections by medically intervening to
treat the disease and by counseling those infected with STDs to
reduce the risk of transmission by disclosing their infection to
partners and engaging in "protected" sexual activity (e.g., using a
condom).
The second meaning of partner
notification, what we term "the duty to disclose," is derived from
the legal doctrine of the "right to know." This "right to know"
developed from the social hygiene movement of the early 1900s
[*pg 15] and likely was
influenced by women's organizations and early principles of
feminism. It developed under tort law that held that a person has a
duty of care toward his sexual partner. This duty may entail an
obligation to disclose an STD to a sexual partner or to reasonably
protect the partner from avoidable health risks. In some instances,
a health department or physician may ask a patient to disclose the
STD to his partner, a concept often referred to as "patient
referral" since the patient makes the disclosure.
The third meaning of partner
notification is derived from a related legal doctrine known as a
"duty to warn." Through conversations with an infected patient, a
physician may conclude that certain persons are at risk of
contracting the disease. Under the "duty to warn," physicians
treating a patient for a sexually transmitted disease have a duty to
inform fully foreseeable third parties of their exposure to the
infection, regardless of whether the patient consented to such
notification or the patient's identity was protected.22
This practice is sometimes known as "provider referral," as the
health care professional (or public health counselor in contact
tracing programs) makes the disclosure.
Similar to theories of tort law
later enacted in statutory law, the duty to disclose and the duty to
warn have as their principal objective the protection of unaware
individuals from exposure to disease by others who know of their
infectious conditions and are in control of their actions. The
judicial imposition of these duties may have had the unintended
result of decreasing the transmission of infectious disease among
certain populations. The imposition of these duties thus shared a
primary goal with contact tracing: the reduction of infectious
disease transmission in society. In this Part, the broad concept of
partner notification is developed further by examining the theories
underlying these three meanings of partner notification.
[*pg 16]
A. Contact
Tracing
1. An Historical Perspective
a) Development of Contact Tracing
with a Focus on Syphilis. The historical origins of contact tracing
date back to the syphilis epidemic beginning at the turn of the
sixteenth century in Europe.23 The appearance of syphilis
in Europe has been attributed to the transport of the disease from
the New World by the crew of Christopher Columbus after his 1492
expedition, although this attribution has never been confirmed.24
The disease was spread quickly by the dispersion of the
multinational mercenary army of the French ruler, Charles VIII,
after they suffered an outbreak of what the English called "the
Great Pox"25 during the siege of Naples in the Italian
Campaign of 1495.26 Syphilis surfaced in Germany, France,
and Switzerland in 1495, in Holland and Greece in 1496, in the
British Isles in 1497, and in Russia in 1499.27
By 1530, syphilis28 was
recognized as a sexually transmitted disease that could be
controlled by regulating the sources of infection.29
Early regulations focused on methods developed to control other
epidemic diseases such as leprosy and the plague. Syphilitics were
banished from the community;30 other communities
quarantined those infected in special hospitals created to house and
treat [*pg 17] them,31
or simply prohibited them from entering public places or from
associating with certain persons.32
i) Reglementation.
People saw prostitution as a "reservoir" of venereal diseases such
as syphilis. Since prostitution was practiced widely in most of
Europe at the inception of the syphilis epidemic, governments
subsequently focused regulations on prostitutes in an attempt to
thwart a known avenue of disease transmission.33
Prostitutes were expelled from Bologna, Ferrara, and other cities
beginning in 1496.34 A proclamation of the town council
of Aberdeen, Scotland in April 1497 ordered that in "protection from
the disease which had come out of France and strange parts, all
light women desist from their vice and sin of venery and work for
their support . . . [or risk] . . . being branded with a hot iron on
their cheek and banished."35
Attempts to control syphilis in
Europe also involved the medical inspection of prostitutes through
regulations that came to be known as reglementation.36
Although early medical treatment for syphilis was highly toxic and
therefore largely ineffective,37 reglementation was
emphasized as a way to control the spread of the disease through the
medical inspection and certification of prostitutes. It was
implemented in conjunction with efforts to abolish prostitution
completely.38 While efforts to curb prostitution
essentially failed, reglementation [*pg
18] was practiced until the nineteenth century in Europe.39
Criticism of government-supported medical inspections of
prostitutes, however, was prevalent. Many viewed the
government-funded inspections as the countenance of prostitution.40
Others questioned the validity of medical findings derived from the
inspection process.41 Although the efficacy of condoms in
blocking the transmission of STDs like syphilis was accepted
medically, few physicians accepted their use due to opposition from
religious and nationalist groups concerned about the concurrent
prevention of pregnancy.42
In the United States, the St. Louis
Experiment of 1870-1874 established a government-sponsored program
requiring the inspection of prostitutes.43 The St. Louis
City Council passed the "Social Evil Ordinance" on July 5, 1870,
appointing six physicians to inspect all registered public women of
the city. Prostitutes afflicted with venereal disease were committed
to a special "Social Evil Hospital" until they were certified as
cured. Despite the claim of the City Health Officer, William
Barrett, that the program had "lessened disease, suffering, and
death and reclaimed fallen women,"44 the Missouri state
legislature nullified it in 1874.45 In Illinois, the
Board of Health had the authority to hospitalize any
[*pg 19] woman suspected of being
infected with syphilis and to place placards on her home stating
"suspected VD."46
Private industries also practiced
reglementation. In 1899, the Minnesota Iron Company undertook
reglementation in conjunction with their mining operations in the
northern part of the state.47 A system of thorough and
regular examinations was performed among prostitutes working in
parlors located on company property. Infected women were treated and
forbidden to solicit patrons. Male clients suspected of being
infected with an STD were advised to consult a physician and were
expelled from the house of prostitution until their STD status was
ascertained. When suspected males consulted physicians, the men were
questioned about the house where they had contracted their disease.
They were asked to provide the names of the women who may have
infected them. This crude form of contact tracing resulted in a
complaint brought against company parlors and the medical
examination of suspected women.48
ii) The Progressive Era.
At the turn of the twentieth century, societal and medical changes
influenced the development of contact tracing. This was the
Progressive Era, an age of social reform in which health care
professionals and progressive social reformers described venereal
disease as a destroyer of the family unit and a social evil.49
Three medical breakthroughs were crucial: (1) syphilis and gonorrhea
were shown to be caused by infectious organisms transmitted through
sexual contact; (2) a reliable diagnostic test for the diseases was
developed by Dr. Adolph von Wassermann in 1907; and (3) a
medication, Salvarsan, was identified as an effective, although
still toxic, treatment for syphilis.50
In the United States, dissidents
challenged the traditional view of venereal disease as a "medical
secret" between the patient and his physician. With enhanced
knowledge of the cause and transmission of STDs like syphilis and
gonorrhea, "innocent" victims (generally married women) of venereal
disease became vocal. Patient confidentiality, primarily among male
patients, was considered secondary to the perceived ethical
obligation51 to warn unsuspecting
[*pg 20] spouses or fiancées
about an infected partner.52 Although the belief remained
that "[p]rostitution is responsible to the greatest extent for the
dissemination of venereal diseases,"53 the concept of
contact tracing, which arose from reglementation, was generating
more interest, largely due to the perceived injustices suffered by
sex partners who were unaware of their risk.54
With the return of the United States
troops after World War I and the relative failure of the military to
stymie STDs among soldiers,55 however, federal funding to
combat venereal disease decreased significantly. Despite the
lobbying efforts of numerous women's groups, by 1921 Congress had
discontinued appropriations to the Interdepartmental Social Hygiene
Board, which had been created three years earlier for the purpose of
protecting troops from venereal disease.56 The fiscal
ravages of the Great Depression further decreased funding for
combating venereal disease. As incidence rates of syphilis
infections rose, many social hygienists blamed the increased
prevalence on the relaxed sexual morality of the 1920s, not on a
pattern of decreased public health funding.57 Whether due
to changes in sexual morality and behavior or a decrease in public
health funding, the syphilis epidemic in the United States had
worsened.58
[*pg 21]
iii) The Influence of Thomas Parran,
Surgeon General. By 1936,
the New Deal was in full swing. In the spring of that year,
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed Thomas Parran as
Surgeon General.59 With a background in preventive
medicine and epidemiology, Parran had as a primary public health
goal the control and eradication of the syphilis epidemic. He
advocated the reporting of STD infections to state health
authorities, notification of the partners of infected persons,
compulsory treatment, and isolation of sources of infection when
necessary.60 Recognizing that a major barrier to the
identification and treatment of syphilitics had been the
moralization of the disease, Parran explained the disease in terms
of costs to the public. It was estimated that fifteen million
dollars was spent annually on the ambulatory care of venereal
patients, and three times that amount was spent on individuals
institutionalized due to insanity, blindness, or paralysis from
syphilis.61 After securing substantial federal funding,62
Parran further educated the public about the syphilis threat,63
organized mass screening programs for testing,64 and
began a national contact tracing program. His five-point program for
controlling syphilis consisted of case finding,65 prompt
therapy at no cost to the patient, contact
[*pg 22] tracing and
notification, premarital testing66 and prenatal testing
for congenital syphilis,67 and public education.
Studies of the period sought to
demonstrate that contact tracing was an important part of syphilis
control programs when properly executed.68 Two doctors,
Dudley C. Smith and William A. Brumfeld, described the essential
qualities of a contact tracing program: (1) public health
interviewers should emphasize the medical aspects of the disease
rather than its moral implications; (2) confidentiality should be
stressed throughout; (3) after the names of sex partners and close
associates are elicited from the patient, the patient should be
encouraged to notify the contacts; (4) public health departments
should send a letter advising each contact to seek medical
examination; and (5) legal measures to compel compliance should only
be used as a last resort.69
Parran's efforts in relation to the
syphilis epidemic marked the first time in the United States that
formal case finding and contact tracing were applied to a sexually
transmitted disease on a national scale.70 Before the
role of contact tracing in reducing infection rates could be
explored effectively, the use of penicillin as a potential curative
treatment for syphilis had been developed in 194371 and,
by the end of World War II, it was available to treat the disease.72
The advent of penicillin had a remarkable effect on the treatment of
syphilis. The inci- [*pg 23]
dence of syphilis infections73 and death rates74
dropped significantly over time. Syphilis, one of the greatest
epidemics in history, finally had been brought under control due in
part to an aggressive public health campaign, including contact
tracing, and in part to the timely availability of penicillin
treatment.75 Currently, new cases of syphilis in the
United States have fallen to a forty-year low.76 Although
prevalence rates remain unacceptably high in the southeast and among
African-Americans,77 the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
is hopeful that transmission of the disease can be eliminated in the
United States in the near future.78
b) Development of Contact Tracing
with a Focus on HIV/AIDS. Of course, syphilis would not be the last
STD epidemic of the century. In June 1981, the CDC's Morbidity
and Mortality Weekly Report documented an unusual pneumonia in
five homosexual men from Los Angeles.79 Later identified
as the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the HIV/AIDS epidemic has
presented new challenges for public health officials.80
It also has presented chal- [*pg 24]
lenges similar to those of earlier STDs like syphilis.81
One obvious similarity between the modern AIDS epidemic and the
syphilis epidemic of the twentieth century is the societal response
to the two diseases. Fear and stigmatization of those infected
initially prevailed during both epidemics.82 The societal
response to homosexuals, prostitutes, and injection drug users
(IDUs) infected with HIV strangely is similar to the treatment of
sex syphilitics and prostitutes during the syphilis epidemic. In
contrast, the response to children, hemophiliacs, and
heterosexually-infected persons with HIV is significantly more
tolerant, like society's response to "innocently" infected wives,
mothers, and children with syphilis a century earlier.83
Regardless of the similarities
between the syphilis and HIV epidemics, medical evidence also has
shown that they are intertwined. Common STDs like syphilis,
gonorrhea, chlamydia, and genital herpes are known to increase the
risk of HIV infection.84 The association between STD
infection and HIV may be due as much to risky behaviors, including
drug use,85 of persons likely to become infected with
multiple STDs, in addition to the immune suppressed state of those
infected with common STDs.86 It only can be guessed as to
the course of HIV policy had these findings been known earlier.
Almost from the inception of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, issues of
patient confidentiality and funding87 in the context of
contact tracing reemerged. "HIV exceptionalism,"88
suggesting that public health activities for HIV were markedly less
aggressive than for other STDs, became hotly debated.
[*pg 25]
The public health response to AIDS
focused on individual responsibility.89 The use of
contact tracing enraged gay rights organizations,90 civil
rights groups,91 and even some public health officials.92
Although some states tried to establish mandatory partner
notification programs,93 most programs and state
educational initiatives centered on individuals protecting
themselves from infection.94 Public health officials
struck a balance between maintaining patient confidentiality and
ensuring that known parties were informed of possible exposure to
HIV.95 As a result, officials attempting to control the
epidemic emphasized the personal obligation of the infected to
notify their past and future partners.96
2. The Contemporary Practice of
Contact Tracing. Contact tracing is primarily the responsibility of
state health departments. Differing needs of individual communities
render contact tracing suitable to [*pg
26] state and local control.97 While no federal
system of partner notification exists, the CDC, as part of the
Department of Health and Human Services, provides funding to state
and local health departments to perform a variety of testing,
screening, and partner notification services related to the HIV
epidemic.98 As a condition of funding eligibility, state
health departments are required to implement partner notification
programs according to CDC guidelines.99 Under this
system, "standards, procedures, and practices vary widely from state
to state."100 Recently, the CDC proposed new parameters
for partner notification, or what it calls "partner notification
support services" (PNSS).101 These proposals would
require federally-funded contact tracing programs to provide a
comprehensive set of supplemental services, including testing,
medical treatment, and counseling, in addition to notification
assistance.102
While states, therefore, are not
federally mandated to provide partner notification services,103
states that choose to accept federal funding for such programs must
adhere to CDC guidelines regarding partner notification. In this
way, the CDC guidelines establish national criteria controlling the
operation of federally-funded contact tracing programs operated by
state and local governments. The guidelines allow public health
authorities to practice two primary models of partner notification
-- patient referral and provider referral. An
additional model known as conditional referral is a hybrid
combination of the two,104 which often prevails in modern
practice.
With patient referral, index
patients, who are identified through testing at public health
clinics, physician referrals, or through contacts of other infected
persons, are asked to contact their sex partners and IDUs with whom
they have [*pg 27] shared
syringes and needles.105 A public health official assists
the index patient by providing counseling, education, contact cards,
and telephone or mail reminders to the patient.106
Patient referral programs provide no assurance that contacts are
actually notified, little control over the quality of the
information actually conveyed, and no confidentiality protection for
the identity of the index patient.107
Provider referral
programs switch the responsibility
for notification to trained public health personnel who locate
contacts based on names, descriptions, and addresses provided by
index patients.108 Information regarding their exposure,
possible infection, and treatment is provided to partners in a
counseled environment, preferably during a face-to-face meeting
between the contact and a public health professional.109
The confidentiality of the index patient is protected by declining
to reveal the patient's name to contacts,110 although in
many instances, contacts are aware of the source of their exposure
through their own deduction or other means.111 Provider
referral programs are more expensive to administer than patient
referral programs because of a significant outlay of state personnel
and resources. The confidentiality of index patients, however, is
protected better through such programs, as is the quality of the
information conveyed to contacts. In addition, there exists a
greater potential that contacts will be informed.112
Conditional referral
occurs when public health personnel obtain the names and other
information about the index patient's contacts, but allow the
patient a period of time to notify them directly.113 If
the contacts are not informed within the designated time period, a
public health worker informs them of their exposure without
revealing the index patient's identity.114 As a hybrid
model, conditional referral programs share many of the same
weaknesses and benefits of patient referral and provider referral
programs mentioned above.
Many states statutorily have
authorized public health authorities at the state or local level to
utilize contact tracing as part of its comprehensive public health
strategy for controlling STDs, including HIV/AIDS. While the law of
these jurisdictions varies, Table A below summarily charts the
statutory sources and general application of these laws.
[*pg 28 -32]
TABLE A - STATUTORY
AUTHORIZATION FOR CONTACT TRACINGa
|
State |
Disclosures for contact tracing?b |
Statutory Source(s) |
Classification of Programsc |
Specific Diseases Coveredd |
|
Alabama |
Y |
ALA.
CODE § 22-11A-38(a), (d) (1997) |
PR |
CD |
|
Alaska |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
Arizona |
Y |
ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-664(B)(3), (K) (West 1993) |
PR
PR |
CD
HIV |
|
Arkansas |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
California |
Y |
CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(d) (West 1996) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Colorado |
Y |
COLO.
REV. STAT. § 25-4-402(3) (1997) |
PR |
STD |
|
Connecticut |
Y |
CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-215(c), -584(a) (1997) |
PR
PR |
CD
HIV |
|
Delaware |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
District of Columbia |
Y |
D.C.
CODE ANN. § 6-117(a)-(b) (1995) |
PR |
CD |
|
Florida |
Y |
FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 381.004(3)(e)(5), .26(1), .26(3)(West 1993
& Supp. 1998) |
PaR
PR |
HIV
STD |
|
Georgia |
Y |
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-47(h)(3)(B) (1995) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Hawaii |
Y |
HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 325-101(a)(4)-(5) (Michie 1996) |
PR |
HIV,
AIDS |
|
Idaho |
Y |
IDAHO CODE § 39-610(2) (1993) |
PR |
HIV,
HBV |
|
Illinois |
Y |
410
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 325/5(a), /5.5 (West 1997) |
PR
CR |
STD
HIV |
|
Indiana |
Y |
IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-41-7-4(c) (Michie 1993) |
PR |
HIV,
AIDS,
HBV |
|
Iowa |
Y |
IOWA CODE ANN. § 141.6 (West 1997) |
CR |
HIV |
|
Kansas |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
Kentucky |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
Louisiana |
Y |
LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.14E(1)(a) (West 1992) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Maine |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
Maryland |
Y |
MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 18-337(b) (1994 & Supp. 1997) |
CR |
HIV |
|
Massachusetts |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
Michigan |
Y |
MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5114a (West 1992) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Minnesota |
Y |
MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 144.4172(4) (West 1989) |
PaR |
CD |
|
Mississippi |
Y |
MISS.
CODE ANN. § 41-23-1(9) (1993 & Supp. 1997) |
PR |
AIDS,
CD |
|
Missouri |
Y |
MO.
ANN. STAT. § 191.656.2(1)(d) (1996) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Montana |
Y |
MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-16-1009(3) (1997) |
CR |
HIV |
|
Nebraska |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
Nevada |
Y |
NEV. REV. STAT. § 441A.220.5 (1996 & Supp. 1997) |
PR |
CD |
|
New Hampshire |
Y |
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§
141-F:9 (1996) |
PR |
HIV |
|
New Jersey |
Y |
N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 26:4-41 (West 1996) |
PR |
STD |
|
New Mexico |
Y |
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-9.3 (Michie 1997) |
PaR |
STD |
|
New York |
Y |
N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782.2(c), .4 (McKinney 1993) |
PR |
HIV |
|
North Carolina |
Y |
N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 130A-143(4), (8) (1995) |
PR |
HIV,
AIDS,
CD |
|
North Dakota |
Y |
N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-07.5-05.1(f) (1991 & Supp. 1997) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Ohio |
Y |
OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.241(3), .243(B)(1)(a) (Banks-
Baldwin 1994) |
PR |
HIV,
AIDS |
|
Oklahoma |
Y |
OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-502.2(A)(4) (West 1997) |
PR |
CD |
|
Oregon |
Y |
OR.
REV. STAT. § 433.045(3) (1992) |
n/a |
HIV |
|
Pennsylvania |
Y |
35 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7605(e)(1)-(2) (West 1993) |
PaR |
HIV |
|
Rhode Island |
Y |
R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-11-10 (1996) |
PR |
STD |
|
South Carolina |
Y |
S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 44-29-90, -146 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp.
1997) |
PR |
STD,
HIV,
AIDS |
|
South Dakota |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
Tennessee |
Y |
TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 68-10-102, -115 (1996); |
PR
PR |
STD
HIV |
|
Texas |
Y |
TEX.
CODE ANN. § 81.051 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Utah |
Y |
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-3.5(1)(b) (1995 & Supp. 1997) |
PR |
HIV,
AIDS |
|
Vermont |
N |
- |
- |
- |
|
Virginia |
Y |
VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-36.1(A)(11) (Michie 1997) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Washington |
Y |
WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.24.022, .105(2)(g) (West 1992) |
PR
PR |
STD
HIV |
|
West Virginia |
Y |
W. VA.
CODE § 16-3C-3(d) (1998) |
PR |
HIV |
|
Wisconsin |
Y |
WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 252.12(2)(1) (West 1991 & Supp. 1997) |
PaR |
HIV |
|
Wyoming |
Y |
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-4-133(c) (Michie 1997) |
PR |
STD |
|
Notes:
a. The Table summarizes those
jurisdictions which have enacted statutory law
explicitly providing for or allowing contact tracing by
state or local governments. It does not chart sources of
administrative or common law which may allow for the use
of contact tracing in jurisdictions which have not
otherwise enacted statutory law authorizing its
implementation.
b. Yes [Y]; No [N].
c. Provider Referral [PR]; Patient
Referral [PaR]; Conditional Referral [CR].
d. Contagious or Communicable Diseases
in general [CD]; Sexually-transmitted Diseases in
general [STD]; Human Immunodeficiency Virus [HIV];
Acquired Immuno-deficiency Syndrome [AIDS]; Hepatitis B
[HBV].
|
Consider an example of a contact
tracing program as an illustration.115 A local health
department begins a contact tracing program with the names of 100
[*pg 33] persons (index cases)
known to be infected with a certain STD. Based on CDC sex partner
indices, each index case will on average report 1.8 total sex
partners116 for an aggregate total of 180 sex partners
who are potentially identifiable. Of the 100 index cases, half are
either married or engaged in a long-term, primarily monogamous
sexual relationship. The identity of the marital or other monogamous
partner either is already known or is easily obtainable by the
health department without the assistance of the index patient. An
estimated 50 sexual contacts of the index case are thus readily
identifiable. This leaves 130 additional sexual partners whose
identities are unknown. The goal of the contact tracing program is
to identify, locate, and contact these 130 persons.
Accomplishing this objective
requires the participation of as many index cases as possible.
Statistics based on a study of 25 HIV-positive women in New Jersey117
reveal that 68% of index cases would voluntarily provide the names
of their sex partners to health authorities provided their own
identity was not revealed to the contacts. Only 20% of these same
index cases would participate, however, if their identities were
revealed. As these data indicate, maintaining the confidentiality of
index cases is vital to the ability of authorities to track
contacts.118 If the program in question is based solely
on patient referral where confidentiality is not protected,
authorities may expect the participation of only 20% of the index
cases, or 20 persons, which in turn would locate approximately 20%
of the remaining 130 unidentified, potential contacts, or twenty-six
persons. Thus, a patient referral program would potentially locate a
total of 76 contacts (50 spouses/long-term partners + 26 other sex
partners voluntarily notified), or 42% of all 180 identifiable sex
partners.119 Of those persons reached, each would know
the source through which they were exposed to infection.
A conditional referral program may
fare slightly better than one based solely on patient referral since
the health department guarantees that it will not disclose the
identities of index cases. The premise of a conditional referral
program is, however, that index cases will notify their sexual
contacts directly. Only when index cases have failed to do so would
health authorities assist. Since the confidentiality of index cases
ultimately is not guaranteed, many index cases will not participate
voluntarily.
Only through the implementation of a
provider referral program can health authorities assure index cases
that their identities will not be revealed. Of course, this does not
mean that some contacts will not guess correctly the identities of
the index cases. Regardless, where 68% of the index cases
voluntarily participate with such programs as statistics suggest,
approximately 88 of the remaining 130 unidentified potential
contacts would be named. A provider referral program thus
potentially could locate a total of 138 contacts (50
spouses/long-term partners + 88 other partners voluntarily
disclosed), or 77% of all 180 identifiable sex partners.120
Of these contacts, only persons who shared sexual or drug relations
solely with the index case in the past several years
[*pg 34] would know for certain
the source through which they were infected or were in danger of
being infected. Since confidentiality is preserved, many contacts
remain unaware of the source of exposure, although they would be
counseled to practice safe sex with every partner to prevent future
exposures.121
Contact tracing in its traditional
sense thus arose from a history of government control of STDs. As
one form of partner notification, contact tracing represents a
traditional activity of the state to protect the public from
epidemic diseases. The voluntary nature of participation is a
principal feature of traditional contact tracing. Maintaining the
confidentiality of index patients, while not a central feature of
patient referral and conditional referral systems, is important in
encouraging patients to volunteer their partners' names.
B. Duty of
Infected Persons to Disclose
While the duties of infected persons
to disclose and health care workers (HCWs) to warn partners of
exposure to STDs share characteristics with contact tracing,
particularly the quintessential feature of notifying sexual
partners, significant differences between these duties and contact
tracing exist. The differences between the meanings of partner
notification confuse policy formulation and mar societal conceptions
of contact tracing programs. In this Part the history of the common
law duty of infected persons to disclose their infectious condition
to their partners is traced and a modern description of the duty to
disclose is provided. In the next Part, the duty of HCWs to warn the
sexual or needle-sharing partners of their infected patients is
explained further.
The underlying tort concept of
"duty" is important to understanding the differences between the
three meanings of partner notification. A duty is a legal obligation
to conform to a certain standard of conduct towards another person.122
Of the many factors that determine the existence of a duty, the most
important is the foreseeability of risk of harm to another.123
If it is foreseeable that a person's behavior will cause harm to
another, that person has a duty to take reasonable
[*pg 35] steps or "due care" to
avoid such behavior.124 In the context of the
transmission of infectious diseases, "due care" requires at a
minimum disclosing one's condition to others at risk of exposure,
including sexual or needle-sharing partners.125 The
breach of the duty to disclose or warn constitutes tortious, and
occasionally criminal, conduct when it results in harm to another.
The duties to disclose and to warn
represent a more serious, obligatory side to partner notification.
Whether imposed judicially or statutorily, they are grounded in the
obligation to do no harm to others. In combination, they require
that certain persons, including those infected with STDs and the
HCWs treating them, inform foreseeable, unknowing sexual partners of
the risks of exposure to [*pg 36]
infection.126 The impetus of these duties is the
protection of individuals, not necessarily the concern for public
health as is the focus of contact tracing.
Since these duties traditionally
have been imposed on individuals, they generally must be carried out
by the individuals upon whom they fall, as opposed to being carried
out by government health officials who assist with contact tracing
among volunteering individuals. The duties do not present voluntary
choices left to the discretion of infected persons and HCWs127
since the failure to notify persons at risk when required to do so
may result in civil liability and criminal sanctions.128
In addition, unlike at least one form of contact tracing (provider
referral), the satisfaction of these duties generally breaches the
confidentiality of infected persons directly, when imposed on the
patient, or indirectly, when imposed on HCWs. Under either
circumstance, the identity of the infected person is important to
fulfilling the duty: persons are entitled to know the individual
source of danger of which they are unaware.129
The duty of infected persons to
disclose to their partners the threat of STD exposure originates in
the general duty to warn of contagious diseases (which itself is
based on the duty not to harm others).130 Since the turn
of the century,131 civil and criminal courts have imposed
duties to disclose on infected persons
[*pg 37] who are aware of the danger of infection.132
Persons with contagious diseases like whooping cough133
or tuberculosis,134 or their guardians,135
were required to warn others with whom they came into contact. The
same duty has been imposed on other responsible parties, including
innkeepers,136 parents,137 landlords,138
and most notably, physicians,139 when it is foreseeable
that preventable harm will fall on identifiable third parties.140
[*pg 38]
The judicial origins of the duty to
disclose STDs can be traced to 1866.141 Early claims,
often brought by aggrieved wives against infected husbands, usually
were barred on the basis of the interspousal immunity doctrine.142
The interspousal immunity doctrine arose from the legal fiction that
recognized a husband and his wife as a single identity. As a result,
it was considered morally and conceptually objectionable to permit
tort suits between spouses.143 With the adoption of
Married Women's Acts into state law, wives began to achieve separate
legal identity from their husbands as states abrogated the doctrine.144
Although criminal liability for transmission of an STD from a
husband to his wife was imposed in the United States as early as
1917,145 it was not until 1920 that a wife was allowed to
bring a civil cause of action against her husband for the
transmission of an STD.146
From its origin in common law, the
modern duty to disclose requires infected persons to notify persons
exposed to infection, whether sexually or through the sharing of
drug injection equipment among IDUs.147 Spouses and other
sexual partners148 can recover tort damages for breaches
of this duty149 [*pg 39]
through actions brought on the varied bases of assault or battery,150
fraud or misrepresentation,151 infliction of emotional
distress,152 seduction,153 and negligence.154
A crucial issue is whether it is
reasonably foreseeable that sexual contact or needle sharing might
harm one's partner.155 In general, a "reasonable person"
who knows or should know that they have an STD must communicate this
knowledge to any sexual partner prior to sexual relations.156
The knowledge of infection can be actual or constructive. 157
In general, "[a]ll courts agree that if
[*pg 40] one has actual knowledge of infection with an STD,
he or she at the very least has a duty to warn his or her sexual
partner."158
Yet, in some instances, imposing a
duty to disclose may be difficult where an infected person is
unaware that he is infected since he is not symptomatic.159
Since some sexually transmitted infections manifest immediate
symptoms, it is reasonable to impute knowledge of infection, even
though a person actually may not have been diagnosed as infected,
and thus impose a duty to disclose.160 Constructive
knowledge of one's infection thus is sufficient to impose liability.
To hold otherwise and require actual knowledge may provide an
incentive for some persons to avoid diagnosis and treatment in order
to avoid knowledge of their own infection.
Some STDs like HIV have long latency
periods in which persons may not know that they are infected for
months or years.161 HIV has caused courts and
commentators to struggle to define when the duty to disclose arises.162
As one court questioned, "at what level of knowledge of the HIV
virus should a [person] foresee potential harm to [his sexual
partner] such that [he] acquires a duty to act as a 'reasonably
prudent person', as well as to disclose [his] knowledge of the HIV
virus to [his sexual partner]."163 To date, courts have
been reticent to impose [*pg 41]
a duty based solely on a person's sexual history.164
Rather, the person must have had some reasonable basis for knowing
their infected status, such as a positive test result, symptomology,
or knowledge that a previous sexual partner was infected.
C. Duty of
Health Care Workers to Warn
|