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Stigma,
Threat, and Social Interactions
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/bec/papers/blascovich_et_al_stigma.htm
Jim
Blascovich, Wendy Berry Mendes, Sarah B. Hunter, and Brian
Lickel
University
of California, Santa Barbara
To appear
in: Heatherton, T, Kleck, R., and Hull, J. G., (Eds.) (in
press). Stigma. New York: Guilford Publications, Inc.
Stigma, Threat and Social Interactions
The chapters in this and many other volumes attest to the
importance of stigma as a construct in psychology, sociology,
and related disciplines. Not surprisingly, stigma enjoys a long
history as a central construct in social psychology investigated
by both psychological and sociological social psychologists.
Many theorists have explicitly or implicitly woven stigma into
their explanations of stereotyping, prejudice, social justice,
and social identity. Researchers have accumulated a wealth of
information regarding the impact of stigmatized others (or
“targets”) on affective and cognitive processes of perceivers
and a more modest but substantial amount of information
regarding the impact of a stigma on the bearer. Researchers
have also accumulated much knowledge on the social identity of
the stigmatized, the consequences of membership in stigmatized
groups, and coping with stigma (see Crocker, Major, & Steele,
1998, for a review).
Advances have also occurred in the definition and delineation of
stigma. Crocker, Major, & Steele (1998) define stigma as “the
possession (or belief that one possesses) some attribute or
characteristic that conveys a social identity that is devalued
in a particular social context.” Stigmas may be visible (e.g.,
acne) or concealed (e.g., many cancers), physical (e.g., Star of
David armband) or abstract (e.g., religion), inborn (e.g., skin
color) or acquired (e.g., prison uniform), simple (e.g.,
birthmark) or complex (e.g., homosexuality), etc. Individuals
may or may not be aware of all of their own stigmatizing
characteristics (e.g., political liberalism or conservatism,
gender), and even if aware, individuals may not continuously
attend to them. Likewise, others (perceivers) may or may not be
aware of the stigmatizing characteristics of those with whom
they interact, and even if aware, may not continuously attend to
them.
The relative paucity of empirical data on stigma effects during
actual social interaction provides a somewhat surprising gap in
the stigma literature (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998). We know
that non-stigmatized individuals negatively stereotype
stigmatized others, avoid them, scapegoat them, etc. We also
know that individuals sometimes categorize others in ways that
stigmatize them so that others will devalue them (one only has
to view political advertisements in the U.S. to realize this).
Non-stigmatized individuals also experience negative affect in
reaction to the stigmatized including specific emotions such as
disgust or fear. These facts point to the often antisocial
nature of social interaction between the non-stigmatized and
stigmatized such as racial conflicts. In most cases, the
sociofugal nature of such antisocial interaction precludes
sustained or meaningful relationships. Physical or
psychological distancing (flight) often occurs, though, in some
cases, aggression (fight) ensues.
Why does
stigma increase the likelihood of antisocial interaction?
Cognitivistic explanations abound. In the context of social
interaction, stigma may elicit negative stereotypes and schemas
on the part of both the stigmatized and non-stigmatized, which
work to poison the social context. The elicitation of negative
stereotypes may even become automatic over time (Devine, 1989)
increasing their insidious nature. Affectivistic explanations
abound as well. Stigma elicits negative affect and emotions
that individuals would rather avoid. We propose that neither a
purely cognitive nor a purely affective account provides the
explanatory power necessary to understand the role of stigma in
social interaction. Furthermore, we propose that understanding
the role of stigma in social interaction requires more than a
simple additive cognitive-affective framework.
We believe
that we can best understand the role of stigma in social
interaction from a motivational framework, one incorporating
both cognitive and affective components to be sure, but one more
than simply the sum or even the interaction of these
components. If we assume that “flight or fight” motivation
contributes to the antisocial nature of social interactions
involving stigma, then one can profitably venture into the area
of motivation to understand more about it. What motivates
psychological or physical flight in interactions involving the
stigmatized? What motivates aggression toward or by the
stigmatized? In a word, threat does. Threat, or the
perception of possible physical or psychological harm, motivates
individuals to protect themselves by flight (e.g., removal) or
fight (e.g., retaliation and escalation).
We support
the not particularly novel proposition (cf. Jones et al., 1984;
Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998) that within the context of
social interaction stigmatized individuals typically but
unwittingly threaten others. Threat can result primarily from
cognitive processes as when perception of a stigmatized other
automatically or otherwise activates a threatening stereotype in
the perceiver. However, we propose that in many cases threat
can also occur by virtue of the stigma itself not because of the
activation of threatening stereotypes but because these stigma
represent affective cues, including unlearned ones, which elicit
threat directly.
We support
the proposition that stigmatized individuals also experience
threat in social interaction and that their experience of threat
occurs via similar (i.e., cognitive and affective) processes.
That the stigmatized experience threat more often than the
non-stigmatized hardly needs debate (Anderson, McNeilly, and
Myers, 1993; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974). That social
interaction between the stigmatized and non-stigmatized often
proves antisocial and sociofugal should not surprise us given
that such individuals mutually threaten one another.
Threat
(and Challenge) as Motivational States
Our work (e.g., Blascovich & Mendes, in press; Blascovich,
Mendes, Hunter, & Lickel, 2000; Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996;
Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey, & Leitten, 1993) has focused on
challenge and threat as motivational states resulting from
individuals’ evaluations1 of situational demands and
personal resources in what we have termed “motivated performance
situations.” Generally, when demands outweigh resources, threat
results; when resources approximate or exceed demands, challenge
results.
Motivated
Performance Situations
Motivated
performance situations are goal-relevant for performers and
require instrumental cognitive-behavioral responses by them.
The necessary goal-relevance of motivated performance situations
means that performers expect that the quality of their
performance will provide meaningful input to their sense of
self-worth. Hence, motivated performance situations necessarily
involve self-evaluation at some level.
Motivated
performance situations require active participation in the sense
that the performers must make appropriate cognitive-behavioral
responses to maintain the structure and the integrity of the
situation. For example, when taking an examination, students
must answer questions. If they do not do so, the situation
changes radically and no longer represents a motivated
performance situation. When individuals stop answering
questions, they disengage and no longer “take” the examination.
The situation may still require coping but no longer coping of
an active or task-focused sort. We contrast motivated
performance situations with other kinds of situations in which
the individual’s responses do not critically define and
structure the integrity of the situation such as watching a
scary movie or a baseball game.
Motivated
performance situations are ubiquitous, abounding in modern
life. They may be primarily solitary and involve only the
implicit presence of others; for example, taking an examination
alone, preparing a speech, solving a puzzle, or writing an
article, or they may be primarily interactive; for example,
arguing with a significant other, negotiating with one’s boss or
subordinate, making a sales pitch, playing games, and engaging
in sports. Motivated performance situations may be
metabolically (e.g., require large muscle movements) or
non-metabolically demanding. We have focused on
non-metabolically demanding performance situations.
Evaluations.
As mentioned above, threat and challenge result from the
confluence of demand and resource evaluations. Demand
evaluations involve the perceptions or assessments (i.e., the
experience of) of danger, uncertainty, and required
effort inherent in the particular motivated performance
situation. At present, we choose not to specify an exact
calculus for demand evaluations using these dimensions. They
may be additive, interactive, or synergistic. Or, evaluations
of high demand on any one of these dimensions may trigger high
overall demand evaluations. Perceptual cues associated with
danger, uncertainty, and required effort undoubtedly contribute
to demand evaluations.
Resource
evaluations involve the perceptions or assessments of
(i.e., the experience of) knowledge and abilities
relevant to situational performance, dispositional
characteristics, and external support. Again, we
choose not to specify an exact calculus for resource
evaluations. Again, they may be additive, synergistic, or such
that high resource evaluations on one dimension triggers high
overall resource evaluations. Perceptual cues associated with
knowledge and abilities undoubtedly contribute to resource
evaluations.
Individuals
may make demand and resource evaluations consciously and/or
unconsciously. Hence, individuals may make demand or resource
evaluations or both without awareness. Conscious and
unconscious appraisals may occur in parallel and may inform each
other. Unconscious evaluations may be reflexive or learned.
Importantly,
evaluations may involve affective (i.e., feeling) processes,
semantic (i.e., cognitive) processes, or both. Zajonc’s work
(Zajonc, in press) demonstrates clearly that affective processes
can occur independently of cognitive ones. LeDoux’s work (1996)
confirms and extends Zajonc’s notions suggesting that affective
and cognitive systems though independent may actually influence
one another. Figure 1 illustrates the incorporation of
conscious and unconscious, affective and cognitive processing
into the evaluation process described above.
We also note
the iterative nature of the evaluation process. Prior to,
during, and following task performance, the individual
continuously reevaluates the situation because neither the
individual nor the situation remain static during motivated
performance situation episodes. Each may affect the other and
external events may intervene. What begins as a demanding
situation for an individual may become less demanding or vice
versa. For example, a doctoral student may be more threatened by
some questions during a dissertation defense than others.
Similarly, what begins as a motivated performance situation for
which the individual perceives few resources may become one in
which he or she perceives many. A speaker may feel more
resourceful as the result of positive audience feedback.
Threat
occurs when as a result of the individual’s evaluations,
resources do not meet situational demands. For example, playing
chess against a player clearly better than oneself results in a
state of threat. Challenge occurs when as a result of
the individual’s evaluations resources meet situational
demands. For example, playing chess against an opponent
perceived as worse or slightly better than oneself results in a
state of challenge. Cases of gross imbalance, such as extremely
high levels of demands compared to resources (e.g., playing
chess against Bobby Fisher) or extremely high resources compared
to demands (e.g., playing chess against an inexperienced young
child) typically do not provide information meaningful to one’s
sense of self-worth thus making the situation non-evaluative or
non-goal relevant, and, hence, non-motivated. In such
situations, threat and challenge states do not occur.
Physiological Markers of Challenge and Threat
Among
physiological response systems, the cardiovascular system
appears particularly attuned to challenge and threat. Although
we would not argue against the proposition that the sensitivity
of cardiovascular responses derives from an adaptive advantage
inherent in the evolution of the “visceral” brain (i.e.,
midbrain and the medial cortex) and its role in “fight or
flight” responses, such a proposition, though consistent with
the rationale here, remains logically unnecessary to it.
We have
delineated two key cardiovascular response patterns evoked
during goal-relevant, motivated performance situations. Based
upon the psychophysiological theory and research of Paul Obrist
(1981) as well as that of Richard Dienstbier (1989), we have
developed physiological indexes of challenge and threat on the
basis of patterns of neurally and hormonally controlled
cardiovascular responses.
Hence,
increases in sympathetic-adrenomedullary (SAM) activity mark
challenge. Neural stimulation of the myocardium enhances cardiac
performance by means of sympathetically enhanced ventricular
contractility thereby increasing stroke volume which together
with unchanged or increased heart rate enhances cardiac output.
Coterminously, adrenal medullary release of epinephrine dilates
arteries in the large skeletal muscle beds and bronchi thereby
decreasing systemic vascular resistance. These responses
result in relatively unchanged blood pressure. This challenge
pattern mimics cardiovascular performance during metabolically
demanding aerobic exercise tasks and represents the efficient
mobilization of energy for coping.
Increased
SAM activity combined with increased pituitary adrenal cortical
(PAC) activity marks threat. PAC activity inhibits SAM caused
epinephrine release from the adrenal medulla. Though increases
in contractility and stroke volume, heart rate and cardiac
output occur, they do so without accompany decreases in systemic
vascular resistance (i.e., vasodilation). Rather, no changes or
even slight increases in systemic vascular resistance tone occur
resulting typically in relatively large increases in blood
pressure. Figure 2 illustrates both the challenge and threat
patterns of cardiovascular responses.
Self-report
Responses.
We believe
that physiological (i.e., cardiovascular) responses provide
continuous, covert, online, unambiguous evidence of challenge
and threat states for individuals within the context of
relatively non-metabolically demanding motivated performance
situations. Whether individuals can self-report these states or
their component evaluations veridically before, during, or after
a performance situation depends on the degree to which affective
and semantic appraisal processing occurs consciously as well as
the extent to which individuals concern themselves with
self-presentation. We believe that much more measurement error
can occur when one attempts to index appraisals via self-report
rather than physiologically though such reports can and do
provide important information to investigators.
Cardiovascular Markers of Challenge and Threat: Validating
Evidence.
We have
validated the specified cardiovascular response patterns as
indexes of challenge and threat by conducting three types of
studies: correlational, experimental, and manipulated
physiology. Briefly (see Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996 for a more
detailed description) all three types of studies point to the
validity of the cardiovascular markers. The correlational
studies (see Tomaka et al., 1993) demonstrated that
participants who self-reported more resources than demands after
receiving task instructions but prior to performing a mental
arithmetic task in a motivated performance situation evidenced
the predicted (see Figure 2) challenge pattern of responses
(i.e., increased cardiac performance coupled with reduced total
peripheral resistance), and that participants who self-reported
more demands than resources evidenced the predicted (see Figure
2) threat pattern of responses (i.e., increased cardiac
performance coupled with slightly increased total peripheral
resistance). Our Experimental study (reported in Tomaka,
Blascovich, Kibler, & Ernst, 1997), in which we induced threat
and challenge via instructional set and nonverbal cues (i.e.,
vocal tone) using the same performance situation and task as in
the correlational studies, also confirmed the validity of our
cardiovascular markers. Those in the manipulated threat and
challenge conditions produced the expected self-reported
pre-task evaluation patterns and also evidenced the predicted
cardiovascular threat and challenge patterns (see Figure 2).
Finally in a set of manipulated physiology studies (also
reported in Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler, & Ernst, 1997), in which
we independently manipulated the cardiovascular patterns to
determine if evaluations followed from the patterns, we found
these physiological manipulations did not affect demand and
resource evaluations .
Stigma
Research Using Cardiovascular Challenge and Threat Markers
We have
begun to examine the effects of stigma during motivated
performance situation involving interactions between
non-stigmatized and stigmatized individuals. This work suggests
that stigmas affect challenge and threat motivation from both
perspectives.
Non-stigmatized perspective.
In one study (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell,
2000; Study 1), we recorded appropriate cardiovascular measures
of non-stigmatized individuals interacting with stigmatized
individuals. In this study, female dyads interacted in a
motivated performance situation involving a speech. Ostensibly,
each dyad consisted of two naïve undergraduate participants,
though, in reality and unknown to the real participant, we
employed one of the undergraduates as a confederate. We
manipulated whether or not the non-stigmatized female interacted
with a stigmatized or non-stigmatized female (confederate). In
the former condition, confederates bore a large, visible
port-wine facial birthmark. In the latter condition,
confederates bore no birthmark. We kept confederates blind to
experimental condition by applying facial makeup to them in both
conditions, either translucent powder for the non-stigmatized
condition, or appropriate colored powder for the stigmatized
condition, and removing all reflective surfaces from their
environment.
We
introduced the confederate and participant after they arrived at
our laboratory. Subsequently, they briefly exchanged
information about themselves, including age, major, hometown,
etc. according to a specifically designed protocol. We then
took the participant and confederate to separate
experimental/physiological recording rooms. There, we applied
appropriate physiological sensors (impedance cardiographic,
electrocardiographic, and blood pressure) to the real
participant. Following a baseline recording period, the
participant received instructions that she would soon work
together on a cooperative task with the other participant but
first would have to deliver a speech on the topic of “Working
Together” for the other participant’s review. We allowed the
participant one minute to prepare the speech and three minutes
to deliver the speech.
Significant
differences in cardiovascular patterns emerged during the speech
between participants interacting with stigmatized confederates
and those interacting with non-stigmatized confederates. As
Figure 3 illustrates, participants interacting with a facially
stigmatized other exhibited the cardiovascular markers of
threat; specifically, increases in cardiac activity (e.g.,
ventricular contractility) and increases in vascular tone (i.e.,
total peripheral resistance). Participants interacting with a
non-stigmatized other exhibited our cardiovascular markers of
challenge; specifically, increases in cardiac activity coupled
with decreases in vascular tone.
Stigmatized perspective.
In a second study (Mendes, Blascovich, Kowai-Bell, & Seery,
1999), we recorded appropriate cardiovascular measures of
stigmatized individuals interacting with non-stigmatized
individuals. In this study, female dyads interacted in a
motivated performance situation including a speech similar to
the one described in the first study. Ostensibly, each dyad
consisted of two naïve undergraduate participants, though, in
reality and unknown to the real participant, we employed one of
the undergraduates as a confederate. We manipulated whether or
not the real participant was stigmatized or non-stigmatized
again using facial birthmarks. In the former condition, we led
real participants to believe that they bore a large, visible
port-wine facial birthmark. In the latter condition, we led
them to believe that they bore no birthmark.
We implemented this manipulation and kept confederates blind to
the manipulation in the following way. We explained to female
participants that we were studying the effects of stigma during
interactions. We further elaborated that in the experimental
condition we would apply make-up that would resemble a port-wine
stain facial birthmark and in the control condition we would
apply translucent powder. In fact, we always applied translucent
powder. After completing several pre-experiment questionnaires,
we showed the participant a digital photo of themselves (with or
without a computer generated birthmark according to the
condition to which they had been randomly assigned) and a photo
of the other “participant” (confederate). The participant and
confederate then met each other and exchanged background
information. Because the real participant did not actually bear
the facial stigma, we kept confederates blind to experimental
condition. Following this interaction, we separated the
participant and confederate and returned them to separate
experimental/physiological recording rooms where we applied
sensors to the real participant. In this study, the participant
and the confederate communicated via a 27” television monitor
and intercom. Similar to the earlier study, the participant
delivered a speech on the topic of working together. Unlike the
perceiver study, however, the “live” connection allowed for a
“face-to-face” speech delivery.
The
cardiovascular responses collected during the speech task
revealed a main effect for stigma condition. Participants who
believed that they bore a facial birthmark exhibited
physiological threat (i.e., increases in cardiac activity and an
increase in vasomotor tone); whereas non-stigmatized
participants exhibited a challenge response (increases in
cardiac activity and a decline in vasomotor tone).
Stigmas
as Evaluation Cues
The results of these studies confirm that stigma cues threat in
motivated performance situations involving interaction between
stigmatized and non-stigmatized individuals. Although we have
not tested any mediators of threat, we believe that these
mediators involve demand and resource evaluations suggested by
our biopsychosocial model. Furthermore, we believe that many
stigma relevant factors can directly and indirectly influence
such evaluations. Here we provide a non-exhaustive discussion
of these factors.
We want to
note that we use the term evaluation cues to mean information
derived from the situation which may elicit cognitive or
affective responses or meaning. Evaluation cues may take the
form of any type of direct sensory input (e.g., visual,
auditory, olfactory) or semantic information or knowledge. As
we have discussed above, these cues may be primarily affective
or cognitive. Furthermore, the relevance of these cues for
demand/resource evaluations may be learned or unlearned.
Finally, individuals may process these cues consciously or
unconsciously.
Typically,
sensory inputs provide cues relating to visible or unconcealed
stigmas such as race, physical deformity, ethnicity, gender,
obesity, etc. Explicit data or information provide cues to
concealed stigmas such as homosexuality, religion, hidden
diseases, etc. Sometimes, physical markers such as emblems
(e.g., lavender triangle, Star of David, the scarlet letter)
provide sensory inputs for concealed stigmas. We maintain that
individuals use these sensory and informational cues in making
evaluations leading either to challenge or threat motivation
during motivated performance tasks involving stigmatized
individuals. That these cues affect non-stigmatized individuals
in interactions involving stigmatized others appears obvious.
That these cues elicit reactions, especially nonverbal ones, by
non-stigmatized others that affect stigmatized others also
appears somewhat obvious. However, that these cues can affect
stigmatized individuals themselves even though self-generated
appears less obvious but no less significant.
Here we
organize our discussion of stigmas as evaluation cues into two
main categories, the first reflecting non-stigmatized
participants’ perspective and the second reflecting stigmatized
participants’ perspective, and two subcategories within each of
these, one reflecting demand evaluations, and a second
reflecting resource evaluations. We chose this organizational
scheme for didactic and heuristic purposes rather than to impose
a neatly defined structure on an admittedly somewhat fuzzy set
of concepts and constructs. Note that we focus the discussion
here on situations involving live interaction between
stigmatized and non-stigmatized individuals.
Stigmas as
Evaluation Cues to non-Stigmatized Interactants during Motivated
Performance Situations.
As described
above, challenge and threat motivation results from the
confluence of demand and resource evaluations. We first
explicate our notions of how stigmas affect demand and resource
evaluations of non-stigmatized individuals limiting our
discussion, as noted above, to interactions with stigmatized
others in motivated performance situations.
Demand
Evaluations.
We maintain that three components, danger, uncertainty, and
required effort, contribute to overall demand evaluations. As
we have suggested above and elsewhere (Blascovich & Mendes, in
press), no exact calculus exists for how individuals factor
component demand evaluations into an overall evaluation; they
may factor additively, interactively, synergistically, or any
one component evaluation may exceed some a threshold triggering
threat.
Danger.
The oft made argument (cf. Crocker et al., 1998; Goffman, 1963;
Jones et al., 1984; Stephan & Stephan, 1985; in press) that
stigmatized individuals threaten others bolsters our contention
that sensory input and explicit information deriving from
stigmas increases the perception of danger on the part of
non-stigmatized interactants. Several theories suggest ways in
which stigmas may lead to perceptions of danger.
Evolutionary
psychologists maintain that humans have evolved innate
mechanisms or modules to assist in their adaptation to their
environments (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992). The detection of
disease via visible markers of physical abnormalities may
arguably have evolved to protect individuals from potentially
dangerous others. Because many visible stigmas (e.g., leprosy
lesions) represent such markers or are similar (e.g., facial
birthmarks) to such markers, evolutionary psychological theory
would predict that individuals’ sense of danger will be raised
when interacting with individuals bearing them. Terror
management theorists maintain that stigmas, whether apparent via
the senses or knowledge, increase the perceived dissimilarity of
others thereby threatening the cultural world view of
non-stigmatized individuals and creating mortality salience to a
greater or lesser extent (Becker, 1973; 1975, Greenberg,
Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1986). Social dominance theorists
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1993) maintain that to the extent that
stigmas indicate that individuals are members of culturally
inferior groups, they represent a danger to the dominant or
powerful groups in a culture. Still other theories suggest that
interacting with devalued others including stigmatized others
creates intergroup anxiety or tension (Devine, in press; Stephan
& Stephan, 1985; Wilder, 1993). To the extent that such anxiety
represents aversive psychological states themselves,
interactions with stigmatized others can be regarded as
dangerous.
Uncertainty.
Non-stigmatized individuals remain relatively unfamiliar with
interactions involving stigmatized individuals because of the
relative infrequency of outgroup compared to ingroup
interactions (Hamilton & Bishop, 1976). Interactions within
motivated performance contexts where individuals may have to
cooperate or compete on some task may well amplify this sense of
novelty and unfamiliarity on the part of non-stigmatized
individuals. Hence, the novelty of stigmatized individuals as
interaction partners increases the uncertainty of the situation
over and above what the actual performance task brings to bear
on the situation. Jones et al. (1984) note that this property
of stigma is less well defined than the others, but state that “
any condition that makes appropriate interpersonal interaction
patterns uncertain or unpredictable…has the capacity to be
disruptive.” Interaction with stigmatized others can make
non-stigmatized individuals uncertain or ambivalent as to the
course of appropriate behaviors.
Required
effort.
Not surprisingly, the amount or degree of effort required in any
motivated performance situation relates to overall demand
evaluations including ones involving social interaction. From
the perspective of non-stigmatized individuals, interaction with
a stigmatized other in a motivated performance situation may
increase perceptions of required effort for a number of
reasons.
First, the
increased uncertainty and lack of familiarity that interaction
with a stigmatized other brings to a socially interactive
motivated performance situation (see immediately above) requires
more effort than one not involving a stigmatized other.
Non-stigmatized interactants must devote increased attention to
the motivated performance situation including partners’ and
their own behaviors especially the subtle nonverbal cues that
govern two-way communication simply because of lack of
familiarity or lack of communicative schemas (Gundykunst, 1984)
with such interaction partners. Increased effort in this regard
may also be necessary as many visible stigmas such as those
associated with disease and deformity are aversive in nature
and, in many cases, nonstigmatized individuals may want to
suppress and or disguise their own nonverbal reactions connoting
negative affect such as disgust or dislike (Devine et al.,
1996). Frable, Blackstone, and Scherbaum (1990) have
demonstrated that nonstigmatized individuals manifest
considerably more effort, in the form of initiating
conversation, talking and smiling more, and encouraging
reciprocity, during interactions with visibly stigmatized
others.
Second,
interactions with stigmatized others may involve additional or
hidden agendas on the part of the nonstigmatized; that is, ones
over and above the overt agenda inherent to successful
performance within the motivated performance situation. At one
extreme, non-stigmatized individuals may strive to present
themselves or to appear unaffected by interaction partners’
stigmas so as not to appear prejudiced against the stigmatized
group (Archer, 1985; Devine, Evett, & Vasquez-Suson, 1996;
Stephan & Stephan, 1985). This requires more effort in terms of
self-monitoring on the part of non-stigmatized interactants. At
the other extreme, non-stigmatized interactants as members of
higher status groups than their partners may seek to justify or
preserve this imbalance (cf. Jost & Banaji, 1996; Sidanius, in
press). Such an agenda would require non-stigmatized
interactants to strive to perform in a clearly superior fashion
to their stigmatized partner. Katz (1981) has suggested that at
least some non-stigmatized individuals may experience
ambivalence alternating between self-presentational and socially
dominating agendas requiring yet even more mental effort in the
situation.
Third,
because stigmas may evoke relevant negative stereotypes even in
non-prejudiced individuals, interactions with members of
stigmatized may require stereotype suppression and replacement
on the part of non-stigmatized individuals (Devine, 1989).
Although this activity serves an adaptive purpose, it also
constitutes an additional task not present during interactions
with non-stigmatized individuals.
Resource
Evaluations.
We maintain that three components, knowledge and abilities,
dispositions, and external support, contribute to overall
resource evaluations.
Knowledge
and abilities.
Self-perceptions of pertinent knowledge and abilities provide
the most apparently relevant component of resource evaluations
on the part of actors in motivated performance situations. If
one must take a math exam, then mathematical ability becomes
relevant. If one must give a topical speech or a lecture, then
substantive knowledge of the topic as well as speaking skills or
abilities become relevant. Yet, the knowledge and abilities
required in socially interactive motivated performance
situations extend beyond task knowledge and technical abilities.
Hence, one must consider task relevant knowledge and abilities
as well as social interaction knowledge and abilities in
motivated performance situations involving non-stigmatized and
stigmatized individuals.
One might
assume that task-relevant knowledge and abilities remain
unaffected by the stigma status of one’s interaction partner.
However, several factors undermine such an assumption. First,
the cognitive resources that one might otherwise apply solely to
the motivated performance task may be co-opted by non-task
related demands (e.g., stereotype and emotional suppression) in
interactions between non-stigmatized and stigmatized individuals
(see above) thereby diminishing the cognitive resources that the
non-stigmatized interactant can apply to the task. Second,
non-stigmatized interactants may question their own typically
unquestioned knowledge and abilities because of social
comparison pressures to perform noticeably better than members
of social devalued (i.e., stigmatized) groups. Even in a
cooperative motivated performance situation, one in which joint
performance determines overall outcomes (i.e., success and
failure), such influences may operate. In a competitive
motivated performance situation, the pressure on the
non-stigmatized might reach even greater proportions. Third,
the nature of a motivated performance situation can affect
knowledge and ability evaluations. In both cooperative and
competitive motivated performance situation, one must not only
consider one’s own knowledge and abilities but also those of
one’s partner. Hence, the non-stigmatized interactant must
judge his or her stigmatized partner’s knowledge and abilities.
Negative performance stereotypes about one’s stigmatized partner
could easily drive the non-stigmatized partner’s evaluation of
joint knowledge and abilities down in a cooperative situation
but one’s own knowledge and abilities up in a competitive
situation.
Interaction skills.
As we noted, research reviews (e.g. Jones et al, 1984) have
identified a dimension of “disruptiveness to communication” that
accompanies interactions involving non-stigmatized and
stigmatized individuals. The non-stigmatized individual may
perceive that he or she does know the most appropriate way to
communicate with stigmatized individuals. In this sense, one
may consider interactions between stigmatized and
non-stigmatized persons intercultural interactions (Wiseman,
1995). For example, members of different ethnic groups may
possess (or believe they possess) different conversational and
interaction styles. Insofar as non-stigmatized individuals
perceive that members of stigmatized groups possess different
conversational and interpersonal norms than their own group’s,
they may perceive low knowledge and abilities in terms of
interaction skills with motivated performance contexts involving
stigmatized others. Again, Frable et al. (1990) demonstrated
more compensatory behavior during interactions by the
non-stigmatized, but importantly the stigmatized paid a price
for their partner’s behavioral compensation. The stigmatized
person received lower attraction ratings (i.e., less likable and
lower intelligence) from the non-stigmatized person.
Dispositions.
The consideration of dispositions as a component within overall
resource evaluations remains somewhat speculative at this
point. Nevertheless, it seems likely that dispositions may
influence resource evaluations on the part of non-stigmatized
individuals within motivated performance situations involving
stigmatized others. Relevant dispositions may include both
general dispositions and ones more relevant to stigmatized
others.
Certain
dispositions contribute to resource evaluations in general.
Some theorists group a limited number of dispositions together
as defining a sort of trait-like resilience or generalized
self-confidence (e.g., Shrauger, 1975). In our challenge/threat
model, high self-esteem, dispositional justice beliefs, and a
generalized sense of control collectively create a dispositional
tendency for individuals to believe they possesses the resources
to succeed in motivated performance situations in general. To
the extent that non-stigmatized individuals are likely to be
more “resilient” or self-confident in motivated performance
situations involving stigmatized others, they may be relatively
predisposed toward high overall resource evaluations. However,
evidence on such dispositional differences between
non-stigmatized and stigmatized individuals appears mixed at
best (Crocker & Major, 1989).
More
specific dispositional tendencies on the part of non-stigmatized
interactants also may contribute to overall resource
appraisals. To the extent that high racist or prejudice
individuals more strongly endorse or have more accessible
negative performance stereotypes and schemas, they are more
likely to make differential knowledge and ability evaluations
when interacting with stigmatized others. Hence, negative
performance stereotypes about one’s stigmatized partner could
more easily drive the high racist’s evaluation of joint
knowledge and abilities down in a cooperative situation but
relative personal abilities up in a competitive situation than
the low racist, non-stigmatized individual’s evaluations. One
could make the opposite predictions for highly empathic
individuals. Authoritarianism, belief in a just world, etc. are
other candidate dispositions that may influence resource
appraisals of the non-stigmatized.
External
support.
The availability of direct external support to interactants
within the context of motivated performance situations varies as
a function of structural opportunities for such support.
External support may take the form of socially supportive
others, or it may take the form of some other types of resources
such as task practice opportunities or specific skills
training.
Some
situations may be purely dyadic and permit little if any direct
social support. Other situations may involve multiple
interactants (e.g, a spelling bee). To the extent that
non-stigmatized individuals predominate in such a situation,
non-stigmatized individuals should feel more comfortable and
supported by the implicit audience (i.e., other non-stigmatized
competitors) than stigmatized competitors. To the extent that
motivated performance situations permit supportive (or
non-supportive) audiences, external support may be relatively
high or low depending on the nature and makeup of the audience.
Presumably, a predominance of non-stigmatized others would
increase the sense of external support on the part of
non-stigmatized performers. Even without explicit audiences,
interactive motivated performance situations may be structured
so that non-stigmatized others occupy non-performance roles such
as evaluators, judges, experimenters, teachers, etc. increasing
the sense of well-being of the non-stigmatized interactant.
To the
extent that non-stigmatized individuals belong to more socially
valued and dominant groups, they are more likely to enjoy the
benefits of external resources in terms of training and practice
relevant to the cultural values of the dominant group. Hence, if
the motivated performance task itself is one valued by or
culturally biased in favor of the dominant group,
non-stigmatized individuals should be advantaged.
Summary.
Clearly, stigmas serve as cues that generally increase demand
evaluations on the part of non-stigmatized individuals including
increases in danger, uncertainty, and required effort.
Regarding danger, many theories converge to suggest that stigmas
elicit perceptions of danger on the part of non-stigmatized
individuals. Regarding, uncertainty, interactive motivated
performance situations increase uncertainty as a function of
novelty, unpredictability and ambivalence for the
non-stigmatized interactant. Regarding required effort, stigmas
cue increased effort as a function of mindfulness, hidden
agendas, and activated stereotypes.
Stigmas may
also serve as cues that influence resource evaluations on the
part of non-stigmatized individuals. However, unlike the
hypothesized increase in demand evaluations by the
non-stigmatized, stigma cues may increase or decrease resource
evaluations on their part. Regarding knowledge and abilities,
we argue that stigma cues generally decrease knowledge and
ability evaluations of the non-stigmatized primarily because of
the taxing of cognitive resources in terms of attentional
demands engendered by stigmatized others as well as deficiencies
in communicative schemata on the part of non-stigmatized
individuals. Regarding dispositional resources, some (e.g., high
self-esteem, strong justice beliefs, high sense of control)
provide non-stigmatized others with a sense of resiliency across
motivated performance situations whereas others (e.g., racism
and authoritarianism) have mixed effects depending on the
cooperative or competitive nature of the motivated performance
task. Regarding external support, all other things being equal,
one might expect that non-stigmatized individuals by virtue of
membership in relative socially valued groups should enjoy
greater resources.
Overall,
because evaluations of demand should increase, and because
evaluations of resources may not offset such demands (and in
many cases may actually be lower), motivated performance
situations involving stigmatized others should prove threatening
to non-stigmatized performers.
Stigmas as
Evaluation Cues to Stigmatized Interactants during Motivated
Performance Situations.
As suggested
above, stigmas may also affect demand and resource evaluations
on the part of the stigmatized in motivated performance
situations involving non-stigmatized individuals. In this
regard, stigmas may serve as distal or indirect cues, ones that
evoke a response by the non-stigmatized interactant that serves
as a proximal cue to the stigmatized individual; for example, an
obese (distal stigma cue) person who notices a look of disgust
(proximal cue) from his or her non-stigmatized interactant.
Stigmas may also serve as proximal cues to the stigmatized
individual; for example, an obese person disgusted directly by
his or her own perceived physical image within the interaction.
Demand
Evaluations.
Crocker, Major, and Steele (1998) delineate a number of
“Predicaments of the Stigmatized.” We recast these and others
unmentioned by these authors under our rubric of danger,
uncertainty, and required effort.
Danger.
The evaluation of danger on the part of stigmatized interactants
increases as a function of experience with prejudice and
discrimination, negative aspects of social identity, and
stereotype threat. Stigmatized individuals learn through
experience that a potential for prejudice and discrimination
exists in all social interactions including motivated
performance situations involving non-stigmatized others
(Goffman, 1963; Jones et al., 1984). Hence, the potential for
danger in social interactions involving both types of
individuals is typically greater for stigmatized than
non-stigmatized individuals. Frable et al.’s (1990) data
demonstrating that stigmatized individuals are more vigilant in
social interactions involving non-stigmatized others suggest an
heightened sense of danger on the part of stigmatized
individuals. Furthermore, awareness of a devalued social
identify places one’s sense of self-worth and collective
self-esteem at risk (Crocker et al., 1998); hence, endangering
the social identity of stigmatized individuals relative to
non-stigmatized individuals in motivated performance
situations. Finally, stereotype threat (Steele & Aronson, 1995)
places the stigmatized individual within motivated performances
at risk of confirming negative stereotypes of their group. In
this regard, their performance puts not only themselves as
individuals in peril but also their stigmatized group.
Uncertainty.
Although stigmatized individuals may find interactions with
non-stigmatized individuals more familiar than the reverse
(Frable, Platt, & Hoey, 1998), certain aspects of interactive
motivated performance situations may still increase situational
uncertainty for them. In the first place, unless their stigma
is one with a distinct physical marker that the non-stigmatized
other is unambiguously able to perceive, stigmatized individuals
may be uncertain as to whether non-stigmatized others are aware
of their stigma. Frable et al.’s (1990) data indicate that
individuals with either concealed or unconcealed stigma are more
vigilant in social interactions involving the non-stigmatized
supports this notion.
Moreover,
stigmatized individuals often face the uncertainty of whether or
not they are interacting with prejudiced or non-prejudiced
others. Compounding this uncertainty, stigmatized individuals
may have difficulty attributing cause for either positive or
negative responses of others to themselves or to their
stigmatized status. Crocker and Major (1989) argue that such
attributional ambiguity provides stigmatized individuals with an
additional attributional explanation for outcomes thereby
increasing the uncertainty of the situation.
Required
effort.
Although, as discussed above, required effort for
non-stigmatized individuals likely increases in interactions
involving stigmatized others, required effort may increase to a
greater extent for stigmatized others. Several lines of thought
and research support this argument.
First, like
non-stigmatized interactants, stigmatized individuals must
devote increased attention to non-stigmatized others during
motivated performance situations. In the case of concealed
stigmas, they must be sensitive to responses of their
non-stigmatized interactants in order to determine whether or
not the stigma is known. For presumably unknown stigma, this
continuous and effortful process involves a variety of
strategies to keep the stigma concealed (Kleck, 1968; Schneider
& Conrad, 1980). In the case of a visible or known stigmas, the
stigmatized must monitor the responses of their interaction
partners to determine the extent to which their stigmas
influences the other, again, a continuous and effortful
process. One might argue that this process is more taxing for
stigmatized individuals than the complementary process for
non-stigmatized individuals (e.g., trying not to appear
prejudiced) because stigmatized persons face potentially more
difficult interaction partners (e.g., racists) than they are
themselves but the comparative difficulty remains an empirical
question.
Second, to
achieve the implicit or explicit goals of the interaction (e.g.,
successful performance in a cooperative task) the stigmatized
individual must often make extra efforts to facilitate the
interaction by keeping it going. For example, visibly obese
women attempt to compensate for the negative attitudes of
others by being particularly friendly and agreeable during
social interactions (Miller, Rothblum, Felicio, & Brand, 1995).
Third,
stigmatized individuals may need to expend extra effort to
counteract the possibility of stereotype threat (Steele &
Aronson, 1995; see discussion above). For example, because a
performance mistake on the part of a stigmatized other is more
likely to be attributed (and conform) to an existing negative
group stereotype (i.e., the stigmatized group is unable to
perform well on the task at hand) than to the individual himself
or herself, stigmatized others must “try harder” not to make
mistakes. Paradoxically, this extra effort may in the end
reduce the quality of their overall performance. Stigmatized
others may also try to distance themselves from their
stigmatized group behaviorally by affecting the qualities of the
non-stigmatized group (e.g., passing) or through denial (Goffman,
1963) thereby adding self-presentational efforts to their task
performance efforts.
Resource
evaluations.
As for their non-stigmatized counterparts, knowledge and
abilities, dispositions, and external support enter into the
evaluation of resources for stigmatized individuals.
Knowledge
and abilities.
Self-perceptions of pertinent knowledge and abilities provide
the most apparently relevant component of resource evaluations
for stigmatized individuals in motivated performance
situations. As we argued above, these pertinent knowledge and
abilities include not only task-relevant ones but also
interaction skills.
One might
assume that task-relevant knowledge and abilities are
unaffected by stigma status. However, self-stereotyping
challenges this assumption. To the extent that a stigmatized
individual truly shares a performance stereotype of their own
group, that individual will then evaluate their own task
knowledge and abilities accordingly (Biernat, Vescio, & Green,
1996). Additionally, to the extent that members of stigmatized
groups have had weaker task-relevant substantive training or
educational opportunities than their non-stigmatized
interactants, they may accurately evaluate their level of
task-relevant knowledge and abilities as low.
Stigmatized
interactants may have underdeveloped interaction skills,
especially with regard to interactions with non-stigmatized
individuals, because of lack of experience in such social
interactions. For example, Goldman and Lewis (1975) found that
following telephone conversations, non-stigmatized interactants
rated the verbal interaction skills of stigmatized (i.e.,
physically unattractive) college students less positively than
non-stigmatized (i.e., attractive) college students even though
they were blind to their stigmatized status. Miller, Rothblum,
Barbour, Brand, and Felicio (1990) replicated this finding for
obese and non-obese women. Although it is not clear that
stigmatized individuals always accurately perceive
underdeveloped interactions skills on their own part, to the
extent that they do we would expect lower resource evaluations
in terms of interactions skills in motivated performance
situations involving others.
Dispositions.
As for non-stigmatized individuals, the consideration of
dispositions as a component within overall resource evaluations
remains somewhat speculative with regard to stigmatized
individuals. Nevertheless, it seems likely that dispositions
may influence resource evaluations on the part of stigmatized
individuals within motivated performance situations involving
non-stigmatized others. Again, relevant dispositions may include
both general dispositions and ones more relevant to stigma.
Like their
non-stigmatized counterparts we would expect that highly
resilient (high self-esteem, dispositional justice beliefs, and
a generalized sense of control) stigmatized individuals may be
relatively predisposed toward high overall resource evaluations.
However, more specific dispositional tendencies on the part of
stigmatized interactants also may contribute to overall resource
appraisals. Anderson and his colleagues (Anderson, McNeilly, &
Myers, 1993) suggest that certain stigmatized individuals
evidence a dispositional style, “John Henryism,” that affects
their motives and behavior in motivated performance situations.
“John Henryism” labels the dispositional belief that one needs
only to work hard enough to overcome even overwhelming obstacles
to succeed. We would expect that stigmatized individuals with
this disposition would likely estimate their resources as higher
than stigmatized individuals lacking such a dispositional
tendency.
External
support.
As for non-stigmatized individuals, the availability of direct
external support to stigmatized interactants within the context
of motivated performance situations varies as a function of
structural opportunities for such support. Again, external
support may take the form of socially supportive others, or it
may take the form of some other types of resources; for example,
task practice opportunities or specific skills training.
In
situations permitting direct social support, stigmatized
individuals should feel more comfortable and supported by the
presence of stigmatized audience members. Indeed, Asch’s (1962)
classic work on conformity pressure suggests that the presence
of even a single other stigmatized individual (i.e., social
deviant) may prove supportive to stigmatized performers in
motivated performance situations. Work by Frable et al. (1998)
found that the presence of similarly stigmatized others
decreases anxiety and depression among stigmatized individuals.
If similarly stigmatized others occupy non-performance roles
such as evaluators, judges, experimenters, teachers, etc.,
stigmatized others should feel more rather than less social
support. Regarding non-social external resources, one would
expect that stigmatized individuals as members of culturally
devalued groups would have less training and practice on
Summary.
We have argued that stigmas serve as cues that generally
increase demand evaluations on the part of stigmatized
individuals including increases in danger, uncertainty, and
required effort. Regarding danger, experience with prejudice
and discrimination, a devalued social identity, and stereotype
threat converge to suggest that stigmas elicit perceptions of
danger on the part of stigmatized individuals. Lack of knowledge
regarding their interaction partner’s awareness of their stigma,
and, even if known, their interaction partner’s level of
prejudice toward their stigmatized group, increase uncertainty
for the stigmatized. The necessity of increased mindfulness in
social interactions with the non-stigmatized, compensatory
behaviors in such interactions, and stereotype threat increased
the perceived level of required effort on the part of the
stigmatized in motivated performance situations.
As for
non-stigmatized individuals, stigma can contribute positively or
negatively to resource evaluations for stigmatized individuals.
Regarding knowledge and skills, stigmatized individuals, as
members of devalued social groups, may have less substantive
task-relevant knowledge and training and minimal interaction
skills. Stigmatized individuals are as likely to benefit from
positive dispositional influences such as high self-esteem,
justice beliefs, and sense of control as non-stigmatized
individuals and may in some cases be predisposed to believe they
can prevail against overwhelming obstacles. Regarding external
non-social support, stigmatized individuals as members of
culturally devalued groups should have less training and
practice in motivated performance tasks relevant to the
cultural values of the dominant group. Hence, if the motivated
performance task itself is one valued by or culturally biased in
favor of the dominant group, stigmatized individuals should be
disadvantaged.
Overall,
because evaluations of demand should increase, and because
evaluations of resources may not offset such demands (and in
many cases may actually be lower), motivated performance
situations involving interactions with non-stigmatized others
should prove threatening to stigmatized performers.
Final
Thoughts
Our
empirical data based on covert cardiovascular indexes of threat
suggest that both stigmatized and non-stigmatized individuals
experience threat motivations when interacting with one-another
in motivated performance situations. Our theoretical analysis
suggest many reasons why component demand and resource
evaluations should lead to such threat motivation. One task
that remains for us (and hopefully others) is to demonstrate the
generality of the empirical threat effects to visible stigmas
other than facial stigmas such as skin color, ethnicity, gender,
obesity, physical attractiveness and to concealed stigmas such
as social status, sexual preference, and certain diseases.
Another, more important task that remains is to test the demand
and resource mediators we have suggested.
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Footnote
1. We
originally used the term “appraisals” to refer to an
individual’s calculation or determination of demands and
available resources. We now prefer “evaluations” for several
reasons. First, we believe that “appraisals” implies a purely
cognitive and conscious assessment of demands and resources. In
our most recent theoretical description of our biopsychosocial
model (Blascovich & Mendes, in press), we assert that both
cognitive and affective, unconscious and conscious assessments
of demands and resources occur. Second, readers often confuse
our use of the term appraisal with Lazarus’. Unlike ours, his
presupposes demands and resources as part of a primary and
secondary appraisal process. Although the theorizing of Larazus
and his colleagues strongly influenced our formulation of the
challenge and threat model, we believe that we extend the
meaning of demands and resources from a purely cognitive
perspective. In sum, we believe “evaluations” is a more accurate
and general term and covers both affective and cognitive,
conscious and unconscious assessments of demands and resources.
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