COPING MECHANISMS OF THE STIGMATIZED: METHODS OF PROTECTING SELF-WORTH

This paper reviews the social psychological literature pertaining to coping with stigma. Recent interest in the perspective of the target of prejudice has led to a vast body of research in the past few years. After introducing the concepts of stigmatization, the paper focuses on different theoretical models that stigmatized individuals may use in order to cope with prejudice and compensate for their stigma. Empirical evidence and current research trends are reviewed with a view towards presenting not only what research has been conducted and how it is being interpreted, but also what questions are being raised and remain unanswered by current social science research.

introduction. A stigmatized person possesses and exhibits an attribute that conveys a devalued personal and social identity within a particular social context (Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998). Stigmatized individuals are commonly the targets of stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination (Biernat & Dovidio, 2000; Brewer & Brown, 1998; Fiske, 1998), face social rejection (Wright, Gronfein, & Owens, 2000), and perceive considerable threat from the nonstigmatized or outgroup (Crocker et al., 1998; Major, 1994). It should be noted, however, that stigmatized individuals do not meet with uniformly negative reactions from the nonstigmatized. Even if the nonstigmatized individual holds prejudiced or stereotypic views about the stigmatized, they may react in a manner incongruent with their true attitudes for a variety of reasons (e.g. Biernat & Manis, 1994; Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Harber, 1998; Jones et al., 1984).

Individuals who interact with a stigmatized other often feel uncomfortable (Kleck & Strenta, 1980; Stephan & Stephan, 1985), and though this discomfort may be alleviated by prolonged or repeated contact (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001), stigmatized individuals may still perceive this discomfort as a threat to personal identity. These uncomfortable interactions may discourage future intergroup activity and communication (Hebl, Tickle, & Heatherton, 2000). Some researchers even suggest that the negative consequences of stigma may be the cause of the increased prevalence of depression among women and cardiovascular disease among African Americans (Allison, 1998); researchers also propose that stigma lowers immune system functioning and increases cardiovascular activity (Clark, Anderson, Clark, & William, 1999). This hypothesis results from the stressor-coping model of stigma (see Miller & Kaiser, 2001 for a review), which sees stigma as a unique stressor (Miller & Major, 2000) with potentially dangerous biological, as well as psychological, effects. Despite the threats that they face, many stigmatized individuals appear to have ego defense mechanisms that prevent these negative attitudes from harming their self-concept as much as one would think (Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker et al., 1998; Crocker & Quinn, 2000). This paper reviews these defense mechanisms, specifically the way in which they serve to mediate and mitigate the effects of prejudice and discrimination and preserve the global self-esteem of the individual, as well as reviewing the empirical research supporting or opposing these hypotheses.

In his most famous book, The Nature of Prejudice, Allport (1954) posed the question, “What would happen to your personality if you heard it said over and over again that you are lazy and had inferior blood?” (p. 42). Allport assumed, as did most psychologists of his time, that the constant negative information that barraged various minorities during the course of their lives had a seriously detrimental effect on their personality and, indeed, on their very self-concept. Erikson (1956) went as far as to say that this stigma prevented the ego (i.e. self) from fully forming, causing an underdeveloped personality. These intuitive explanations certainly seem to make sense and appeal to our logical side. However, as is often the case in social psychology, theories that are grounded in common sense can often be misleading and contain only part of the truth. As Allport and Erikson were personality theorists who predated the heavily empirical emphasis that is now found in personality psychology (see Funder, 2001), their theories were based heavily upon speculation and relied little upon observation of behavior.

While we cannot afford to dismiss the ideas of Allport (1954), Erikson (1956) and others (e.g. Goffman, 1963) per se, what must be recognized is the fact that all of these theories presuppose the assumption that humans gain knowledge of their environment passively. That is, we automatically internalize this negative external information with no strategies of self-protection whatsoever. Recent advances in the field of social cognition have failed to confirm this idea and have, in fact, found quite the opposite. For example, Swann and Read (1981) found that participants engaged in the process of self-verification by spending more time reading information that was likely to confirm their own self-views than reading information that was likely to contradict it, even when their self-views were negative (i.e. they preferred information that confirmed their negative beliefs about themselves). Furthermore, many studies have found evidence for a hypothesis-confirming bias, where people will seek information that fits a predetermined hypothesis or notion and will actively exclude information that may disconfirm their hypothesis or belief (Klayman & Ha, 1987; Kunda, Fong, Sanitisio, & Reber, 1993; Snyder & Cantor, 1979). It would, therefore, be prudent to assume that stigmatized individuals do not passively “soak up” all of the stereotypes and prejudices that they face on a daily basis, but must have some active control in the perception, encoding, and evaluation of the information with which they are faced. Thus, even if they cannot avoid an unpleasant situation, they do have some control over how they perceive such a situation. Such logic is a sine qua non for cognitive defense mechanisms to exist.

While one cannot deny that being the target of stigma is an unpleasant experience with detrimental consequences (Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987; Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Fiske, 1998; Lang, 1991; Quinn & Crocker, 1999; Smart & Wegner, 2000), there is something of a paradox within the psychological literature regarding the extent to which this affects the stigmatized (Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker et al., 1998). According to some theories of self-perception, particularly Cooley (1956) and Mead’s (1934) “looking-glass self”, the prejudice and discrimination by the outgroup should be incorporated into the stigmatized individual’s self-image, thereby lowering their self-worth and global self-esteem. However, Crocker and Major’s extensive review of the literature found that members of stigmatized groups, including African-Americans and women, typically have global self-esteems and views of self-worth (Pelham & Swann, 1988) as high as those of nonstigmatized groups, and in some cases even higher. Crocker and Major proposed several reasons for this apparent discrepancy; they proposed that members of stigmatized groups actively, rather than passively, perceive certain aspects of their environment and that mechanisms such as attributional ambiguity, social comparison, and selective devaluing serve to protect their global self-esteem and self-worth. Two other possible mechanisms that individuals may use to protect themselves from the harmful effects of discrimination and prejudice which were not proposed by Crocker and Major are compensation by the stigmatized on dimensions unrelated to the stigma (Miller, Rothblum, Felicio, & Brand, 1995) and the use of the personal/group discrimination discrepancy (Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990). These theories, their application to specific situations, empirical evidence supporting or opposing their validity, as well as the potential cost to those who employ them, will now be discussed, as well as implications for future research and possible uses for the reduction of stigma.

attributional ambiguity. Perhaps the most hotly contested theory proposed by Crocker and Major (1989) is that of attributional ambiguity. The idea of ambiguity was not original to Crocker and Major (see Snyder & Wicklund, 1981), but their proposal for its method and application was unique. Crocker and her colleagues (Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker et al., 1998; Crocker et al. 1991) have proposed that feedback, whether positive or negative, from an ambiguously prejudicial source may be interpreted by the stigmatized as being caused by their stigma and not resulting from their specific actions (Britt & Crandall, 2000). For example, a woman may attribute the fact that her male boss has given a promotion to another male who is not as qualified as she is as evidence, not that she is a poor candidate for the job, but rather that her boss is prejudiced against her because of her stigmatizing feature, in this case her gender. Experiments attempting to provide support for this theory have been tentatively successful, especially when the stigmatizing dimension happens to be obesity (Crocker, Cornwell, & Major, 1993; Crocker et al., 1991). However, attributional ambiguity may come at a cost to those who utilize it in protecting themselves from prejudice and discrimination. Attributional ambiguity theory suggests that stigmatized individuals may also attribute positive feedback from a potentially biased evaluator as being due to their stigma. They may feel that the person is attempting to compensate for prejudiced beliefs or is attempting to represent himself or herself in a socially desirable light. Recent research (e.g. Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Hansen, 2001; Harber, 1998) suggests that such a positive feedback bias towards minorities may exist in certain situations. Evidence of the existence of this phenomenon may make it even more likely for certain positive evaluations to be attributed to overcompensation rather than merit. Affirmative action provides an every day example of an attributionally ambiguous situation where positive outcomes may be questioned (Major, Feinstein, & Crocker, 1994). An African-American or woman may question whether they received some position based solely upon their abilities or perhaps due in some part to their race or gender. In fact, in the Crocker et al. (1991) study, African Americans made the implicit assumption that the White evaluator used race as a criterion even when they had no reason to assume that he was prejudiced. Research on assumptive help by the nonstigmatized towards the stigmatized also lends weight to this challenge to attributional ambiguity. Stigmatized individuals may view assumptive help as evidence that the nonstigmatized individual does not think them capable of handling the situation without help, giving them a sense of inadequacy and harming self-esteem (Blaine, Crocker, & Major, 1995; Schneider, Major, Luhtanen, & Crocker, 1996).

There also may be social costs associated with making an attribution to discrimination. Some researchers have found that people will view a stigmatized individual more negatively if they make an attribution to discrimination, even if the nonstigmatized subject is certain that the person has been discriminated against (Kaiser & Miller, 2001; Ruggiero & Taylor, 1997). While these experiments are somewhat lacking in ecological validity (i.e. they do not mimic the real world well), their findings make a strong case for the fact that there may be extreme social costs associated with making an attribution to discrimination.

Attributional ambiguity as a theory has some barriers to overcome. While some experiments (e.g. Crocker et al., 1991) lend support to this theory, it has been difficult to replicate repeatedly and across different groups. In fact, Ruggiero and Marx (1999) have presented evidence that attributional ambiguity may be used more often by the high-status group rather than by the stigmatized low-status group. It is possible that attributional ambiguity is mediated by personality factors such as the Belief in a Just World (Rubin & Peplau, 1975) and the Protestant ethic (Mirels & Garret, 1971; Quinn & Crocker, 1999). Current research continues to test this possibility.

While much about the specific mechanisms of attributional ambiguity remains to be discovered, what is clear is that it provides a method of protection of self-image and global self-esteem. By attributing negative feedback and prejudice to another’s discriminatory behavior rather than to our own internal characteristics we preserve ego-integrity (i.e. we preserve the self we have created). What ultimately remains to be determined about attributional ambiguity are the situations in which it is activated, who is likely to utilize it, and what the psychosocial costs may be.

social comparison. Social comparison simply refers to whether individuals choose to compare themselves with a member of their ingroup or a member or an outgroup (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Crocker et al., 1998). The important part of social comparison is that it is a selective process; either consciously or unconsciously, individuals are motivated to choose with whom they compare themselves on a particular dimension. As was mentioned previously, though it would seem logical for people to want the most information possible about a situation and compare themselves to the highest possible standard, often times people would rather confirm preexisting idea of themselves and protect their collective and individual self-esteem (e.g. Klayman & Ha, 1987; Kunda et al., 1993). Social comparison as a stigma coping device states that stigmatized individuals will tend to compare themselves with others who share their stigma (ingroup) rather than the nonstigmatized (outgroup), especially on dimensions that are stigma relevant (Brewer & Brown, 1998); for example, a woman might compare her salary to that of other women that she knows and not to that of men. Evidence has been accumulated to suggest that this ingroup comparison enhances self-esteem (Major, Sciacchitano, & Crocker, 1993). Social comparison is directly related to the phenomenon of ingroup bias and collective self-esteem (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990): we feel more comfortable around those who share our stigma or attributes (Frable, Platt, & Hoey, 1998), we feel more like them, and we share in both their triumphs (Brown, Novick, Kelley, & Richard, 1992) and failures (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998), thus they are the natural ones with whom we compare ourselves (Blanton, Crocker, & Miller, 2000; Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988; Testa & Major, 1990). This is particularly salient in what has been termed “voluntary stigma” (Siegel, 1995), in which the person has had an active role in “choosing” to be stigmatized on a particular dimension.

Considerable evidence has been amassed to support the theory that upward comparison (e.g. stigmatized comparing with nonstigmatized) can have a negative effect on affect, self-esteem, and other personality dimensions, whereas downward comparison (e.g. stigmatized comparing with a group even worse off than themselves) can have the opposite effect (see Crocker et al., 1998 for a review). However, this can create considerable tensions between groups or may exacerbate already existing tension (Brewer & Brown, 1998). The greater the disparity between the groups, the greater the gain in collective and global self-esteem for the high status group, which may lead to derogation of the outgroup (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Crocker et al., 1987; Noel, Wann, & Branscombe, 1995).

devaluing. Crocker and Major (1989) also proposed that stigmatized individuals devalue, or place less emphasis upon, those dimensions upon which their group does poorly and augment those upon which their group does well. This is a rather obvious way in which collective self-esteem may be maintained; for example, African-Americans tend to do worse in comparison to Whites on standardized tests when they are said to measure intellectual potential (Steele & Aronson, 1995), and thus may be more inclined to think that those test do not really measure anything of worth. This sort of psychological disengagement has been proposed as a reason why African-Americans as a group may place less emphasis on activities in the academic domain (Schmader, Major, & Gramzow, 2001): if you are not going to do well on something, perhaps because of an inherent bias or lack of opportunity, why repetitively fail and face the threat to your self-esteem? Coupled with stereotypes about intellectual performance and the possibility of self-fulfilling prophecies, psychological disengagement and devaluing may explain the racial difference in emphasis placed on intellectual performance (Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998).

Devaluing of intergroup differences may be mediated by the perception of legitimacy between the differences of the high- and low-status groups. That is, feelings about whether these status differences are fair or unfair may play an active role in determining which characteristics are devalued and which, if any, may be augmented (Bylsma, Major, & Cozzarelli, 1995; Crocker et al., 1998; Major, 1994).

The obvious drawback to devaluing is that an important dimension may be devalued by a group, causing them economic, social, political, or cultural harm. Devaluing can become cyclical and act as a justification for the outgroup to continue to derogate the stigmatized, and for the stigmatized to stop improving on the devalued dimension.

compensation for a stigmatized dimension. Whereas devaluing seeks to ignore a dimension, compensation fully acknowledges the disparity. Compensation is the equivalent of saying “He’s a better athlete, but I do much better in school.” In situations like this, the stigmatized may attempt to compensate for their stigma on a dimension that is unrelated to it (Crocker et al., 1998; Miller, Rothblum, Barbour, & Brand, 1990; Miller et al., 1995). Miller et al. (1990) found that obese women compensated for their obesity in a social interaction with an increase in social skills when their obesity was made salient. Thus, they strove to remove the negative image of their stigma by showing the other person what a good conversationalist they were. Compensating behavior was found to decrease, however, when the women’s stigma was not made salient to the other person. Compensation is most likely a normal and healthy psychological function that every individual uses on nearly a daily basis. However, it does not necessarily block the prejudice and discrimination of others so much as it seeks to appease them, perhaps leaving the stigmatized with an unconscious feeling of obsequiousness and subservience. Also, there has been very little research done as to what the affective and cognitive consequences of compensating for a stigma may be; the resources used and the negative feelings generated during compensation may be significant.

personal/group discrimination discrepancy. The last coping mechanism discussed is the personal/group discrimination discrepancy (Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990). This psychological phenomenon enables us to perceive and remember discrimination and prejudice against the group to which we belong as being worse than the prejudice and discrimination that we personally have experienced as a member of that group. For example, “Women as a group are discriminated against in the workplace, but I’ve [never/rarely] experienced it.” Women, as a group, seem to be especially susceptible to this phenomenon (Ruggiero & Taylor, 1994), perhaps because they feel that the only socially acceptable way of expressing the discrimination that they face is by referring to it in reference to their group. Essentially, this is a way of saying, “I may have a tough time, but others who are [ingroup], like me, have it worse.” As such, this is not so much of a coping mechanism as it is an inherent cognitive bias, much like the fundamental attribution error1].

the future of stigma research. While there can be no doubt that stigma is ubiquitous, a common question asked by social psychologists is from whence has this stream sprung? Dozens of reasons have been suggested to explain prejudicial attitudes and the stigmatization of individuals. Some believe that stigma is the result of prejudicial attitudes created by personality variables, such as Authoritarianism (Adorno, Frankel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) and Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Others have proposed a more evolutionary perspective, such as competition for resources and the need to bolster self-esteem (Buss & Kenrick, 1998). Terror Management Theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; McGregor et al., 1998; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991) also provides an interesting postulate for the need of an outgroup against whom we must be hostile and aggressive. Perhaps it is indeed a target that we seek, and as Sartre (1946) said: “If the Jew did not exist, the anti-Semite would invent him” (p. 13).

No matter what the reason behind the attitudes, the existence of stigma is unquestionable. The fact that so many different characteristics are considered stigmas in our society is somewhat of a guarantee that nearly every individual will have a stigmatizing trait at some point in their life, be it fleeting or permanent. The methods for coping with stigma are complex, and our understanding of them is quite limited. Crocker et al. (1998) and others have suggested that the effects of stigma upon the stigmatized has been a thus far neglected area of research and that our understanding of stigma can only be increased by considering such an angle. The need for more research is clear, and in particular I see the need for more research into the cognitive and affective consequences of the uses of coping mechanisms. In addition, while most stigma experiments have taken place in the laboratory to ensure internal validity, I believe that more naturalistic and quasi-experimental research must be done to try and model more closely the experiences of the stigmatized in the real world and ensure better external validity. More work must be done with stigmatized individuals themselves and their social support systems (Gaines, 2001; Ruggiero, Taylor, & Lydon, 1997); as Miller et al. (1995) have pointed out, many experiments that deal with stigma randomly assign college age students into a condition in which they are told that they have a stigmatizing feature. This method, while necessary to gain participants and for internal validity, lacks external validity and the real world responses that may come from studying the coping styles of the stigmatized themselves. However, naturalistic studies have inherent validity problems as well, making both naturalistic, experimental, and quasi-experimental studies necessary to provide the convergent validity required in the social sciences.

Many questions raised by the flurry of recent research into stigma have yet to be researched as fully as they need to be. Especially important, in my view, is research dealing with possible ways of ameliorating nonstigmatized-stigmatized interaction conflicts. Research by Miller and Myers (1998) has shown that prejudicial responses by individuals may be prevented or minimized by attempting to be highly socially competent in intergroup interactions. Hyers (1999) has also suggested that education of others may be a way to minimize stigmatization. It is important that this type of applicable research into the reduction of stigma is carried on concurrently with research attempting to understand the societal and individual implications of stigma.

Many thanks are owed to all of those who have helped me in my academic career. Thank you to Professor Heather Horn for recommending this article for publication. Thank you also to Wendy Quinton and Shannon McCoy of the Social Relations Laboratory at UCSB for introducing me to the psychology of stigma. Thanks also to Jessica Hartman and Tessa West for their helpful comments on a previous draft of this manuscript. I owe a deep debt of gratitude to all my friends and family for their love and support. Thank you all.

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[1] “The tendency to infer an actor’s personal characteristics from observed behavior, even when the inference is unjustified because other possible causes of the behavior exist” (Smith & Mackie, 2000, p. 74).

Jeffrey Jay Hansen

University of California, Santa Barbara