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SOCIO-ECONOMIC CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE HIV EPIDEMIC IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA:
A CASE STUDY OF NAMIBIA part
3
Parts:
1
2
3
Many
more women than men are infected with HIV and many more
young women than young
men. In
part, this reflects the inequalities that women continue to
endure in Namibia - in all
aspects
of economic and social life. Their health status is worse
than for men; and they have
much
lower labour force participation rates than men. As the
NHIES concluded, "About 40% of
Namibian
private households are headed by females. The private
consumption level in female
headed
households is about half the consumption level in male
headed households." While there
has
undoubtedly been progress in girls access to education and
in improvements in the legal
position
of women (at least on paper but less so in implementation)
there is still a long distance
to
travel in Namibia. As the UNDP HDR for Namibia concluded in
1996, "In many
communities...attitudes to women are at best outdated and at
worst abominable, as evidenced
by the
high rate of rape and violent crimes against women." In a
world of HIV and of AIDS the
lives of
women have to be changed or there can be no progress in
addressing the fundamental
factors
which are driving the epidemic in Namibia.
Agriculture continues to be the base for most of the
country's population and there is a clear
duality
in this sector with high productivity and incomes for
commercial farmers and low
productivity and basic subsistence for the mass of
traditional farmers. Since the traditional
farming
sector is where most of the poor are concentrated, it
follows that efforts need to be
intensified to raise productivity and incomes. This is
crucial if rural to urban migration is to be
slowed.
Similarly, there is a need to re-examine industrial
development strategies so as to
minimise
the mobility of labour within Namibia. It is well known that
Tourism can be a factor in
HIV
transmission, and while no one would suggest that
development not take place in this
sector,
there is nevertheless a need to ensure that structures and
programmes are in place to
minimise
the possibilities of HIV transmission. In the aggregate all
areas of development
strategy
should be assessed so as to address the ways in which
planned developments have
adverse
effects on the growth of HIV in the population.
Namibia is a
fractured society. How could it be otherwise given its
recent history of colonialism and war
of
independence? It is divided on ethnic grounds, on the basis
of income and wealth, on social class,
and on
gender. But the HIV epidemic requires that society perceive
the risks to its continuation and its
prosperity
posed by the epidemic. As such, the whole of civil society -
not just Government and one or
two large
private employers - have to understand that all are
threatened in one way or the other by the
epidemic. The
challenge for Namibia is how under conditions of social and
economic differentiation to
build a
partnership of all Namibians. There are no blueprints for
how to do this but an attempt must be
made,
nevertheless. The changes in social policy of recent years
with a better distribution and higher
levels of
expenditure on health and education are a start. But the
depth of the social deprivation and
inequalities
- especially those that are gender based - are what is
driving HIV transmission in Namibia.
Unless there
is a more intensive attack on many aspects of the things
that make up the lives of the
poor,
including access to employment and better social services,
there will be little that can be
achieved in
reining back the HIV epidemic.
Epidemiological Situation in Southern Africa
As noted
above sub-Saharan Africa has some 70% of the global total of
30 million people living with
HIV, with
Southern Africa the worst affected region on the continent.
Adult HIV infection rates of
20-25% are
seen in countries with the highest prevalence, with urban
rates in some cities double the
average for
the total adult population. In 1997 it was estimated that
2.4 million South Africans were
living with
HIV - an increase of more than a third compared with 1996.
In Botswana the proportion of the
adult
population living with HIV has doubled over the past five
years (to an estimated 25% in 1997). In
Francistown
the second largest city in Botswana the rate of HIV for
pregnant women is now almost
50% (1997).
In Zimbabwe the adult rate of HIV infection in 1996 was 20%
- one in five of all adults in the
population.
With 32% of pregnant women testing HIV positive in Harare in
1995, and a staggering 59%
in Beit
Bridge (1996). Throughout the region HIV prevalence
continues to increase with rates in cities
increasingly
being mirrored by those in rural areas.
The majority
of new infections are in young people - those between the
ages of 15 and 24 (sometimes
younger).
Thus in Zambia in one recent study over 12% of the 15-16
year olds seen at an ANC were
HIV positive.
In South Africa the % of pregnant 15-19 year olds infected
with HIV rose to 13% in 1996
from about
half that level two years earlier. In Botswana the HIV rate
for the same age group stood at
28% in 1997.
Infection rates in girls and young women are significantly
higher than they are for boys
and young men
of the same age - thus in Malawi it is reported that HIV
infection rates of young women
are 5 to 6
times higher than for young men in the age range 15-20. The
explanation of these differential
rates of
infection are complex, partly physiological and partly
socio-economic. Whatever the causes
the
differentials both create gender biased socio-economic
consequences, and at the same time call
for programme
responses which specifically address the problems of young
men and young women.
The
epidemiological situation in Namibia reflects that common to
other countries in the Region. Data on
HIV for
pregnant women attending ANCs suggest an average rate for
the country as a whole of 15.4%
in 1996 -
this is a tripling of the level of HIV nationwide in the 4
years since 1992. HIV prevalence for
women ranges
from just over 3% to more than 24% in the different
districts; is higher in urban than in
rural areas
(17.6% and 10.9% respectively), and reaches its peak in the
age range 20-34. While AIDS
deaths are
widely under-reported it is still the case that it is now
the leading cause of death for all age
groups in
Namibia. For AIDS to have become the leading cause of death
by 1996 it follows that the
present
estimates of HIV prevalence must be serious under-estimates
of the actual situation in the
country. It
is thus much more probable that HIV rates are closer to
those in neighboring countries such
as Botswana
and Zimbabwe.
Chart I is a
summary representation of seroprevalence for pregnant women
in Southern Africa C it is the
best proxy
available for measuring adult HIV infection. The visual
picture is bleak: the realities of the
lives of
people even bleaker. The epidemic is without a doubt the
greatest threat to sustained
development
facing the Region.
Demographic
Effects of HIV and AIDS
No specific
studies have been undertaken in Namibia into the demographic
effects of HIV and AIDS and
it is thus
necessary to present data which relates to other high
prevalence countries in sub-Saharan
Africa. These
have obvious relevance for Namibia given that HIV prevalence
rates here are similar to
other
countries in the region and that demographic structures are
also sufficiently similar as to make
comparisons
possible. The US Census Bureau has recently published its
estimates of the
demographic
effects of HIV and AIDS on Africa and these are the most up
to date and consistent
estimates and
projections currently available. In what follows the Census
Bureau's estimates and
projections
are presented in the form of a commentary for the main
aggregates under discussion,
together with
Charts to illustrate their projections which compare states
with and without AIDS for the
Southern
Africa region. The following key outcomes are presented
below:
- crude
death rates
- infant
mortality rates
- child
mortality rates
-
population growth rates
- life
expectancy
1. The most
immediate effect of the HIV epidemic is to increase the
crude death rate for the
populations
affected. These will be higher where HIV prevalence is
higher, which in sub-Saharan Africa
is in the
Eastern and Southern regions where the epidemic is most
mature. Within these regions HIV is
highest
generally everywhere in urban settings and so also will be
observable and predicted mortality.
Chart 1
presents data on crude death rates for Southern Africa for
the year 2010. Since crude death
rates are
generally lower in this region that elsewhere in sub-Saharan
Africa so the increases will be
relatively
greater. By the year 2010 the crude death rate is projected
to be 6 times higher in Zimbabwe,
4 time higher
in Botswana and 3 time greater in Zambia than it would have
been in the absence of AIDS
(Chart 2).
2. Infant
mortality rates are already rising sharply in countries with
mature epidemics. Children borne to
mothers who
are HIV positive have a 30-60% chance of becoming positive
themselves. In 1996 infant
mortality
rates in Zambia and Zimbabwe are estimated as being already
25% higher than they would
have been in
the absence of AIDS. In Southern Africa projections for 2010
are that deaths due to AIDS
will more
than double infant mortality rates in Botswana and Zimbabwe,
and be more than 40% higher
in Malawi
(where rates are currently higher than elsewhere in the
Region) and 60% higher in Zambia
(Chart 3).
3. It is
estimated that two-thirds of AIDS-deaths will occur in
children aged 1-4 years. These rates will
increase
since many children who are positive survive past their
first birthday. Child mortality rates are
already
higher today than they would have been without AIDS in some
high prevalence countries. Thus
child
mortality rates are estimated as being 75% higher in
Botswana in 1996. By the year 2010 child
mortality
rates are expected to be twice as high in Botswana, 4 times
greater in Zimbabwe and about
twice as high
in Zambia and Malawi (Chart 4).
4. Projecting
the overall effects on population growth is difficult in
part because it depends on fertility
decisions
which are themselves partly the outcome of the effects of
AIDS, and on decisions made in
the knowledge
of the effects of AIDS. Almost all past projections have
supported the proposition that in
spite of AIDS
most countries will continue to experience positive
population growth. Nevertheless the
Census Bureau
estimates suggest that 2 countries in sub-Saharan Africa
will experience negative
population
growth by the year 2010 - in Botswana the rate is estimated
to be minus 0.4 %(compared to
a without
AIDS rate of 1.9%), in Zimbabwe minus 0.5% (compared to
1.8%), and in Zambia 1.2%
(compared to
3.1%), and in Malawi 0.1% (compared to 2.2%), see Chart 5.
5. The most
striking demographic effects are on life expectancy (Chart
6). Without AIDS all countries
in the region
would have been expected to have increased life expectancy
as has been the case in
recent
decades more or less everywhere in sub-Saharan Africa. The
effects of AIDS will be to increase
mortality for
children and young adults where mortality would otherwise
have been low (and falling). The
result is
that AIDS will have the greatest impact on life expectancy,
which other things being equal is
one of the
most important ways in which improvements in the standard of
living are achieved and
measured. It
is indeed one of the three important elements in the UNDP
HDI because of its value in
summarising
the benefits to individuals (societies) of sustainable human
development.
The estimates
suggest that life expectancy has already been reduced from
64.1 years in Zimbabwe to
41.9. But the
situation in Zimbabwe is projected to deteriorate even
further; without AIDS life
expectancy in
2010 would have been an estimated 70 years but with AIDS it
falls to less than 35 years.
A disastrous
decline and the worst projected for any country in
sub-Saharan Africa. All of the countries
in the
Southern Africa Region are projected to suffer major
declines in life expectancy caused by AIDS
by the year
2010 -- for Botswana from 66.3 to 33.4; for Malawi from 56.8
to 29.5; for South Africa from
67.9 to 47.8,
and for Zambia from 60.1 to 30.3 years.
Estimating
the Impact of HIV and AIDS on Human Development
It is now
generally accepted that the HIV epidemic has multiple and
complex effects on sustainable
human
development. These impacts have their origins in the effects
of HIV and AIDS on the growth in
the labour
force and on the productivity of labour and capital. It also
has effects on demographic factors
in ways which
have been identified above, with the probability that labour
losses due to HIV and AIDS
will erode
the human resource base of the country. It is also the case
that the HIV epidemic will distort
the uses of
national income and through changing its composition over
time will reduce the growth rate
of potential
economic growth.
This effect
will come through two channels. Firstly, a diversion of
savings into less productive uses
(primarily
into health and related expenditures by households and
governments) so that fewer resources
are available
for investment which is the main instrument for achieving
economic growth. With less
productive
investment there will be slower growth in GDP, and, very
importantly less growth in
employment.
For countries which already have severe employment problems
and with large projected
numbers of
youths entering the labour force in the coming years, such
as Namibia, the loss of
employment
opportunities is indeed a major problem.
The second
main channel whereby economic growth may be reduced is
through what might be
described as
"system failure". this could take many forms and have many
causes. The most likely
effect on the
economic system's capacity to function will occur through
the losses of human resources
which are
projected on account of HIV and AIDS. Both the economic and
social systems depend on
the
expectation that individuals and institutions (both public
and private) function more or less normally.
Thus the
expectation is that the legal system functions - that cases
are prepared and heard in a timely
fashion. But
there is evidence that this can no longer be assumed to be
the case for all sorts of
reasons to do
with the effects of HIV and AIDS (witnesses are sick and do
not turn up, lawyers and
court
officials similarly). The examples could be multiplied but
the point is fairly obvious that HIV and
AIDS will
have effects which reduce the capacity of systems to
function and thus will reduce the overall
efficiency of
the country. These are effects which will compound over
time, and are far from easy to
address
through policy and programme interventions. This is not to
suggest that nothing can be done to
reduce system
losses in efficiency, because there are things that can be
done, and indeed it should be
part of the
plans of both the private and public sectors to develop
appropriate programme responses in
advance of
the problems becoming too severe.
An
interesting attempt to capture some of the effects of the
HIV epidemic has been attempted by
researchers
from Columbia University. This is, as with most estimates,
only a partial measurement of
what is a
dynamic process with many contributing elements. As we have
seen above, the epidemic will
have
catastrophic effects on life expectancy in sub-Saharan
Africa - including Namibia. Life expectancy
is one of the
three elements in the UNDP Human Development Index with an
approximate weight in the
index of
one-third (for an explanation of the index and its
construction for Namibia, see the Namibia
Human
Development Report, UNDP, 1996). As was also noted earlier,
the life expectancy indicator can
be seen as a
summarising variable which measures standard of living
achievements for the population
as a whole.
It follows that charting the effects of changes in life
expectancy caused by HIV and AIDS is
very
important for aggregate measures of human development such
as the HDI.
The Box
summarises the results of the estimations undertaken by the
Columbia researchers of the
effects of
HIV and AIDS on the HDI for a number of countries. As can be
seen from the Box the effects
of HIV as
measured by the HDI are very substantial. As was to be
expected those countries with
mature
epidemics and high HIV prevalence rates are most affected.
In the case of Zambia there is a
loss of ten
years of human development progress, for Tanzania a loss of
8 years, and for Malawi and
Zimbabwe
losses of 3-5 years. It should be noted that these losses
relate to the years 1980-1992 when
the HIV
epidemic was exhibiting nothing like the severity it has
imposed on countries of Southern Africa
in recent
years. Furthermore, the predicted reductions in life
expectancy over the next decade or so (as
projected
above by the US Census Bureau) are far greater than those
which occurred during the decade
1980-1992. It
follows that the losses of human development as measured by
the Human Development
Index will be
much greater in the coming years than those estimated by the
Columbia research team
for the past
decade of the 1980s.
The scale of the setback to human development from HIV/AIDS
has
been confirmed by a recent UNDP study carried out by
researchers at
Columbia University and the Harvard Institute for
International
Development. This study concludes that between 1980 and 1992
a
sample of 56 countries from all regions of the world lost on
average 1.3
years of human development progress. And in some countries
the
setback was particularly severe -- for Zambia, more than ten
years,
Tanzania eight years, Rwanda seven years and the Central
African
Republic more than six years. Burundi, Kenya, Malawi, Uganda
and
Zimbabwe lost between three and five years.
The method used compares the actual 1980 and 1992 human
development index (HDI) with the estimated 1992 HDI that
would have
occurred in the absence of AIDS. The impact of HIV/AIDS on
the HDI
operates mainly through the dramatic reduction of life
expectancy. More
than 85% of HIV/AIDS deaths worldwide occur among people
between
20
and 45 years old. The study found only a marginal impact on
the
other components of the HDI. But because HDI is only a
partial
measurement of human development, the impact of HIV/AIDS
goes far
beyond what this study shows.
Source: Bloom, Bennet, Mahal and Noor 1996.
The HDI for
selected countries in Southern Africa has been re-estimated
to take account of the effects
of changes in
Life Expectancy as calculated by the Census Bureau. These
data are given in Chart 7
which
represents the HDI on a With AIDS and Without AIDS basis for
1996 and 2010. These
calculations
need to be treated with caution because of the underlying
assumptions made about the
data over the
projected period. As would be expected given the weight of
Life Expectancy in the HDI
there are
quite strong changes in the level of the index for
individual countries in 1996 when all of the
countries
show a decline in their HDI value. It is difficult to
interpret what these changes mean in any
absolute
sense (losses of human development due to AIDS), and it may
be simpler to view the data for
a single year
in terms of the changes in relative ranking of these
countries - a worsening of their HDI
performance
in all cases.
It is
possible to draw somewhat stronger conclusions from the
projected movements of the HDI over the
period
1996-2010, again bearing in mind the caveats noted above
about the assumptions underlying the
projections.
One way to interpret the data is to look at individual
countries and compare the Without
AIDS case in
1996 and 2010, such as Botswana where over this period there
would have been an
increase of
the HDI. This can be compared with the With AIDS case where
over this period there is a
decline in
the HDI. In other words the improvement in human development
that would have occurred in
the absence
of AIDS in Botswana does not materialise. Instead Botswana
will witness an actual fall in
its HDI over
the projected period such that human development in 2010 is
reduced below what it was in
the Without
and With AIDS cases in 1996. Confirming the expectation that
potential human
development
is lost because of the AIDS epidemic. This experience is not
confined to Botswana alone
but is
general to other countries in the region with high levels of
HIV prevalance.
It is
similarly possible to construct a forward looking HDI for
Namibia which takes account of HIV and
AIDS. The
results of doing this are reported below. It needs to be
realised that the 2 Scenarios which
are given are
based on estimated data and have unknown errors. They are
presented in order to get an
idea of the
effects on human development as measured by the HDI and are
NOT projections. Two
scenarios are
developed:
Scenario
1 is the better case and has used Life Expectancy data for
South Africa (US Census
Bureau
Institute estimates) to derive the with and without AIDS
information, and has applied a
negative
factor of 0.5% each year to the Income per Capita data. The
Educational component of
the
Index is assumed to be unaffected by the epidemic.
Scenario
2 is the worse case and has used Life Expectancy data for
Botswana as a country
with
similar HIV prevalence and many other characteristics which
are similar to Namibia. A
factor
of minus 1.0% per annum has been applied to the Income per
Capita component of the
Index on
the grounds that the effects of the epidemic will be more
severe in this Scenario than in
1. The
Educational Attainment Index has been assumed to be the same
as in Scenario 1.
Comments
The behaviour
of the HDI for Namibia for both scenarios is given in Chart
8. Scenario 1 is the less
worse case of
the two simulations for essentially two reasons. In the
first case life expectancy is
expected to
fall by less in the With AIDS case and income per capita to
also decline by less than in
Scenario 2.
These different assumptions with respect to life expectancy
are what are largely driving the
changes in
the HDI in the two different Scenarios. In the case of
Scenario 1, what the data suggests is
that human
development because of HIV and AIDS will more or less show
no improvement over the
decade,
whereas if HIV had not been present in the population there
would have been significant
improvement.
In effect, HIV and AIDS causes a loss equivalent to a 7%
improvement in the HDI
compared with
1996.
Scenario 2
represents a significantly worse case. In part this is due
to the much more severe
worsening in
life expectancy which is assumed in the With AIDS case
(without AIDS this would have
improved
between 1996 and 2006). There is also an assumed greater
impact of HIV on growth in GDP
per capita
compared with Scenario 1. Over the decade in the Without
AIDS case there would have been
significant
improvement in the index of the order of 7% compared with
1996. In the With AIDS case
there is an
actual fall in the HDI in the order of 3% compared to 1996.
In effect there is a net loss over
the decade
compared to 1996 in the With AIDS case of 10% of the level
of the HDI in that year. Or to
put it
another way the HIV epidemic will cause a loss equal to
about 5 years of the improvement in the
HDI due to
social and economic development that would otherwise have
taken place.
Both of these
Scenarios paint a picture of losses of human development
which are severe for a country
such as
Namibia where the HDI already places the country very low
down in the UNDP rankings (116
out of 174 in
1996). It represents for the mass of the population who live
in abject poverty yet a further
deterioration
in their living standards. Because the HDI is dealing in
aggregates it masks the scale of
the worsening
in human development that will be the outcome of HIV and
AIDS in Namibia for most of
the
population. Most of the impact of the decline in life
expectancy and of the slower growth in average
per capita
income caused by the epidemic will fall unequally on those
who are already the most
deprived, and
least able to cope with the multiple impacts of the
epidemic.
Part 3 :
ESTIMATING SECTORAL IMPACTS OF THE EPIDEMIC IN NAMIBIA
1. Households
The previous
sections have identified the probable effects of the
epidemic at the national and at the
personal
level. There can be no doubt that for individuals and their
families there will be intense personal
suffering as
families attempt to deal with the personal, social and
economic effects of illness and death.
The
expectation has to be that there will be both immediate
effects on individuals and their families as
they try to
cope with losses of earnings and additional medical costs.
But the effects at the personal
level will
also be longer term since households will attempt to deal
with the immediate effects of illness
through
depletion of savings (if there are any) and disposing of
other assets (such as land). This will
mean that in
the longer team the sustainability of households either as
social units (families where
children are
supported and socialised) and/or as productive units (as in
subsistence agriculture) will be
threatened.
The evidence
from other countries in sub-Saharan Africa is mixed, both in
terms of the impact on
individual
and family poverty and on the sustainability of households.
What is clear, as in the Kagera
Region of
Tanzania, is that households are only able to survive the
effects of HIV on family members
through
drawing down extensive assistance from NGOs and their
relatives. It is best to use as a
working
assumption that families affected by the epidemic will need
psycho-social support from their
communities
and from NGOs, and others, as well as economic support if
they are to cope. This
assistance
will not usually be automatically forthcoming and
communities and CBOs/NGOs, as well as
Government,
will have to support institutional and other development so
as to cushion the impacts on
families.
Unless this is done there will be intense social and
economic distress for those often least
able to cope
(the poorest) together with longer term problems of how to
maintain families as social, and
economic
institutions.
2. Productive
Sectors
a.
Subsistence Agriculture
Households
have been treated separately from other productive sectors
although it is obviously the
case that
they account for a significant part of the national output,
both measured and none-measured.
This is most
obviously true in the case of subsistence agriculture from
which some 50% of Namibians
derive their
support. Most of the poorest in the country are concentrated
in this sector, where the
capacity to
withstand the effects of the epidemic on production is least
developed. What is evident from
other
countries' experience is that adjustment to losses of
productive labour through the illness and
death of
family members is possible but also difficult. Thus there is
evidence that surviving children,
who may have
lost both parents to HIV-related illnesses, often have
problems in retaining family land
and other
assets (such as housing and animals). There is a clear need
to strengthen the rights of
survivors -
which will often include widows as well as children - if
families are to continue to produce
food and
marketable outputs. These matters cannot and should not be
left to individuals to cope with,
and there is
a clear and identifiable role here for the Ministry of
Agriculture and for social sector
ministries,
as well as NGOs, if the sectoral effects of the epidemic on
this very large number of
Namibians is
to be minimised. Government, and others, have to begin now
to plan for the
consequences
so as to develop the structures and the programmes for what
is going to become the
largest
single problem flowing from the epidemic. While this sector
may account for only some 3% of
GDP it is,
nevertheless, the primary support for half of the
population.
b. Commercial
Agriculture
About 4000
farmers employing some 36000 workers account for some 9% of
GDP. This sector is thus
an important
contributor to national output and a major source of
employment. It follows that what will
happen to HIV
infection in this sector is of great importance. But the
sector (unlike mining) is
characterised
by many independent producers (farmers) which will make it
difficult to create a common
interest in
responding to HIV and AIDS. The same factor of physical
isolation as well as productive
independence
makes it difficult for the workers to respond (even if other
conditions made this possible -
such as
labour unionisation). But this important sector, like all
other sectors in Namibia, will be
significantly
affected by illness and death of workers - both skilled,
supervisory, and unskilled.
The evidence
from other countries in sub-Saharan Africa is that the
effects of the HIV epidemic are
already being
felt on commercial farmers, e.g., in Kenya and Zimbabwe.
These effects cannot now be
avoided for
HIV infection is already high in the adult population
throughout Namibia. The epidemic will
impose
significant costs for producers in terms of lower labour
productivity and higher costs generally -
some of these
will be direct and some indirect (as the epidemic effects
the suppliers of other services
such as
mechanical repair and transport) and as the epidemic effects
the general performance of the
economic
system. While some of the costs are now unavoidable there
are things that the sector can
do as a
sector through appropriate organisation. In part, the
objectives should be to minimise the
effects of
HIV and AIDS through planning for the consequences of
existing infection in the work force,
and also to
undertake those activities which can reduce future HIV
infection. It has to be assumed, for
example, that
many skilled and supervisory workers will be infected and
that these workers will not be
at all easy
to replace, even if this is possible in the case of
unskilled workers.
Whatever the
actual situation facing individual farmers, there is a joint
interest as a group in doing
whatever can
be done to minimise the effects on the commercial farming
sector. An obvious first step
would be to
communicate with commercial farmers in Zimbabwe in order to
observe and learn from their
activities.
There is also an obligation on this sector to help their
workers and their families cope with the
consequences
of illness and death. These are obligations which should not
be just shrugged-off by
farmers, nor
should Government permit this to happen. More generally the
farming community has a
social
responsibility to take a leadership position in the national
response to the epidemic and for this
to be
possible their organisations need to both formulate a
strategy for action and become active.
c. Mining
This sector
accounts for about 12% of GDP and for some 3.5% of
employment. As such it is not only a
major
contributor to national output but it also accounts for no
less that 50% of total merchandise
exports. It
has, therefore, a critical role in the economy - a role
which is currently irreplaceable both in
terms of
foreign exchange earnings but also as a source of financial
revenue for the financing of
Government.
As with other sectors it will have to deal with HIV
infection amongst its labour - at both
managerial,
skilled and unskilled levels. Since it is a "modern" sector
it will incur all the usual direct
costs
associated with the epidemic - absenteeism, health costs for
employees and sometimes for
dependents,
retraining costs and additional recruitment costs, etc. But
since labour costs account for
such a small
proportion of total costs, it is unlikely that these
additional costs will have dramatic effects
on what are
profitable activities. But effects the epidemic will have -
in addition to the direct costs listed
above -
largely through the effects of managerial and supervisory
labour losses. These losses of human
capacity will
not be easy to replace even if it is the case that more
unskilled labour losses can be
absorbed more
easily through new recruitment.
Again there
are possibilities of learning about what to do to prevent
new infections in the labour force
and how to
minimise the costs for the enterprises in this industry.
There is a clear gap between firms
such as
Namdeb which have instituted prevention activities and that
of other firms in the industry. This
gap needs to
be closed as also are industry practices which recruit
single sex (male) labour. This
pattern of
recruitment has been a major element in HIV transmission in
Southern Africa and needs to
be ended as a
matter of urgency. This splitting of families through single
sex recruitment has not only
led to male
HIV infection but has been part of the process whereby HIV
is passed to wives and
spouses in
the rural areas. It is thus part of the mechanism for
increasing rural HIV infection rates.
Government
should act to prohibit such practices if the industry is
unable or unwilling to do so in its
own interest.
It would be useful for the industry and the National AIDS
programme to look at what has
been
accomplished in Botswana (by DEBSWANA) and to see what can
be done for the labour force in
terms of
recruitment practices and in health/welfare provision for
the families of workers.
d. Financial
Sector
This sector
performs essential services which are integral to the smooth
operation of the economy. It
accounts for
only a small proportion of GDP and for only small numbers of
workers. But these
indicators in
no way measure the central importance that banks, other
financial intermediaries such as
insurance,
brokers, etc., play in economic life. It is instructive that
some of the larger enterprises
operating in
Namibia have instituted HIV prevention programmes and again
it is essential that all of the
major
institutions establish similar activities for their staff.
It is also
important that Government concern itself with some of the
business activities of these firms.
Elsewhere in
Africa (and in other parts of the world) these financial
enterprises have introduced policies
which, while
they serve the interests of their shareholders, are
definitely NOT in the interest of clients -
nor of
society as a whole. There is a clear conflict here between
private business interests and those of
society. For
reasons, which are perfectly plausible for the companies,
they have introduced restrictions
of life
insurance cover (often denying benefits to those who die
from AIDS), restrictions on health cover,
and
restrictions on access to mortgage finance for housing. The
industry should not be allowed such
freedom in
respect of activities which are so central to the lives of
many Namibians. They make it
possible for
the industry to impose conditions in respect of financial
contracts which are inimical to an
effective
national response to the epidemic. As such, it is essential
that Government look at existing
practices by
FI in conjunction with industry representatives; look at the
changing patterns of industry
regulation in
other countries who have had to face similar practices, and
then establish new regulatory
structures
and controls. This should be done preferably through
agreement, but if this proves
impossible,
then through the use of the law.
e. Fishing
The fishing
industry is a growing sector of the economy. At
independence, this sector produced 1.5%
of GDP; by
1996 it had increased its share to 4%. The sector provides a
large amount of employment,
and is
expected to surpass the mining sector in the number of jobs
provided by the year 2000.
The boom in
the fishing industry has been one of the major factors in
the migration of job seekers to
Walvis Bay
and Luderitz, the two principal sites of the fishing
industry. The HIV epidemic can affect this
development
in a number of ways. Firstly, the industry acts as a focal
point for the transmission of HIV
by drawing
job seekers and workers from various parts of the country.
When infected with HIV workers
spread
infection to their home areas during their frequent visits.
Secondly, as has been the case in the
mining sector
throughout Southern Africa, schemes for housing workers
contribute to conditions in
which
infection can spread rapidly. Many workers live in either
large dormitory compounds or in
severely-cramped single quarters, where a room built for one
person now accommodates twenty or
more. Coupled
with their isolation from families and communities,
conditions in these areas increase
the
possibilities for the spread of HIV and other STDs among
workers. Finally, the fishing industry
requires
large numbers of trained workers both on fishing boats and
in processing. As HIV/AIDS leads
to losses of
human resources, the industry will be forced to spend more
on training, pensions and
medical aid
and other costs.
f. Government
The
Government accounts for about 30% of GDP and for about the
same proportion of formal sector
employment in
Namibia. As such, it is by far the largest sector in the
economy, and it is also a major
user of
highly trained and professional/managerial workers.
Government in all economies provides
services
which are essential to the smooth running of the rest of the
society and economy. It is
inconceivable
that Namibia could achieve its development objectives
without an effective and efficient
public
sector. Whether one is looking at public administration pure
and simple, or public services (such
as legal and
judicial) or economic services (such as communications and
water). These are all
essential
services and the extent that they are there and provided
efficiently has implications for the
functioning
of the whole system.
But
Government is also the largest source of employment in
Namibia with obligations to its employees
and to their
families. Not only does Government have an obligation to
ensure that it provides the
services
needed by other sectors, it also has an obligation to secure
the health of its employees and
their
families. As was noted elsewhere in this Paper, HIV is no
respector of class or position and, if
anything,
there are higher rates of infection in higher occupational
groups - almost certainly including
employees in
the public sector. In other countries in the region there
are already major problems in
maintaining
human resource capacity in the public sector, with high
levels of absenteeism and labour
turnover at
all levels of the public services and in public sector
industries. The effects are evident in the
costs that
fall on the public sector and on the deterioration in public
services associated with morbidity
and
mortality.
These are not
easy matters to rectify but as with everything else it is
possible to minimise the
consequences
of the impacts on public services through appropriate
planning for what is going to
happen as a
result of existing HIV infection amongst employees. This
means establishing
interdepartmental committees assisted by expertise from
outside to monitor what is happening (on
sickness and
absenteeism) and to begin to plan for some of the effects on
public services - both at
central and
local levels. It is also necessary to establish for the
public service appropriate conditions for
those
infected with HIV to ensure that there is no discrimination
at the place of work, and that
appropriate
policies are introduced to maintain people in employment for
as long as possible through
access to
health care and social support. Workers can, with
appropriate support systems and access
to health
care, remain productive for many years, and it is efficient
that they be enabled to do so. It is
also morally
right that they be supported so as to be able to continue to
work for as long as possible for
personal
reasons - including supporting their families. At the
present time there are very few Ministries
which have
introduced HIV in the Workplace programmes and this is
something that they should be
supported to
do, drawing on the considerable experience that now exists
in the region about how to
introduce and
manage such programmes.
This is by no
means a complete analysis of the conditions facing the
different sectors in Namibia but it
provides a
starting point for planning for the changes required because
of the epidemic. Changes in
policies and
in programmes there will have to be. The responsibility lies
with Government, but little will
be
accomplished unless there is a partnership between the
various concerned parties. There is much
expertise in
Africa now which can be exploited, and there is no need to
begin these activities as if there
was no
existing stock of knowledge and capacity in existence.
CONCLUSIONS
It is now
generally recognised that the HIV epidemic is not only a
threat to the nation's health, which it
is, but also
has fundamental consequences for sustainable development.
The transmission of HIV is
not random in
the population, who gets infected with the virus and what is
the spatial distribution of
infection is
determined by factors which reflect structural social,
cultural and economic forces in a
country.
Namibia is no exception to the pattern which is being
repeated throughout sub-Saharan Africa.
Elsewhere in
Africa, particularly in the East, Central and Southern
regions, the epidemic has cut a
swathe
through the population, causing intense personal suffering
for those infected and affected. But
the effects
of the epidemic extend beyond the personal, terrible as
these are, and communities and
nations also
have to live and cope with the damaging consequences of the
losses of their most able
and
productive members. None of this is inevitable, although
countries including Namibia have no
choice but to
try and ameliorate the consequences for the society and
economy of past HIV infection.
Those
infected will have to be cared for through public and
private provision for them and their families.
There will
inevitably be social costs, including an intensification of
the already extensive poverty in
Namibia, just
as there will be economic costs as productive sectors try to
grapple with the losses of
productive
labour. But these consequences, while inevitable, can be
managed and can be minimised
through
policy and programme responses.
There are two
challenges facing the nation -- not just Government.
The first is
to address through policies and programmes the fundamental
factors -- some health related
and others
social (such as gender inequality) and others economic (such
as poverty and income and
asset
inequality) -- which have created ideal conditions within
which HIV can be transmitted.
Government
has already embarked on actions which begin to address many
of these issues but there
remains much
that needs to be done.
The second is
to seek to create a national awareness of the risk that HIV
and AIDS poses for the
nation. This
means seeing the epidemic as an ongoing threat to
development and as such a factor
which will
constrain all of the futures open to Namibia. It requires no
less than a social mobilisation;
everyone from
the poorest Namibian to the richest has a stake in
overcoming this threat to human
development.
BIOGRAPHICAL
NOTE
Desmond Cohen
is an economist with university teaching experience in
Africa, Canada, the UK and the
USA. Formerly
he was a Governor and Associate Fellow at the Institute of
Development Studies,
University of
Sussex in the United Kingdom and until 1990, he was Dean of
the School of Social
Sciences. He
has both research and applied macro-economic policy
experience in a number of African
and Asian
countries. Previously he was an adviser to the British
Treasury on international financial
policy. In
1997-98 he was Director of the HIV and Development Programme
(UNDP), and currently he is
Senior
Adviser on HIV and Development.
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